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The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and 
the Private Uses of Eminent Domain 
Wendell E. Pritchett1 
In 1 952, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (DCRLA) 
announced a sweeping plan to clear and redevelop the southwest quadrant of 
the nation's capitol. Max Morris and Goldie Schneider were two business 
owners affected by the proposal. Schneider operated a successful hardware 
store that had been in the family for decades; Morris owned a department store. 
The agency, which had designated the area as "blighted," planned to acquire 
their buildings, demolish them, and transfer the cleared land to the Bush 
Construction Company. Schneider and Morris, however, refused to sell.' To 
prevent the government from taking their properties by eminent domain, they 
filed suit, alleging that taking their buildings would violate the Public Use 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states 
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation."2 Their claims would wind their way to the United States 
Supreme Court, which concluded in the 1954 case of Berman v. Parker that the 
condemnations were constitutionaL' 
The DCRLA's victory, which set the stage for a nation-wide expansion of 
the urban renewal program, was the result of a careful, sustained effort by 
advocates of urban renewal to shape the jurisprudence of eminent domain. 
From the early 1920s through the 1940s, renewal advocates developed their 
argument that cities were in crisis and that only major changes in property law 
could prevent urban decline. They used these claims to secure the right to 
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank the 
following people for their comments on this Article: Regina Austin, Bob Ellickson, Ben Field, Howard 
Gillette, David Theo Goldberg, Beth Hillman, Gail Radford, Joel Schwartz, and Reva Siegal. Special 
thanks to Sally Gordon and Anne Kringel for their comments and encouragement. This Article benefited 
greatly from feedback received from presentations to colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, Temple Law School, The Columbia University Seminar on the City, Rutgers-Camden Law 
School, New York Law School, and the Law and Humanities Junior Scholar Workshop. 
1. See George Beveridge, Suit Challenges Slum Program for Southwest, EVENING STAR, Dec. 27, 
1952, at AI2; George Beveridge, Fund to Press Project B Fight in Court Sought, EVENING STAR, Nov. 
17, 1953, atB l .  
2 .  U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
3. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Morris's and Schneider's cases were originally filed 
separately, but they were merged by the three�judge panel that considered the constitutional claims. 
Morris's case was appealed to the Supreme Court while Schneider's case was returned to the trial judge 
and became moot after the Court's opinion in Berman. See Consolidation of Two Suits Against Project B 
· Ordered, EVENING STAR, Feb. 10, 1954, atA23. 
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condemn property and turn it over to others who would use it more 
appropriately, thereby changing the meaning of the Public Use Clause. 
The conflict between Morris, Schneider, and the D.C: government, as well 
as the battles over urban renewal in general, illuminate a critical tension in 
American law and . politics: the struggle to balance the rights of individual 
property owners against societal interests in the development, or protection, of 
scarce resources. It is a longcheld axiom .that government cannot take the· 
property of one person and give it to another. That principle, however, has 
frequently been honored in the breach. For two centuries, local, state, and 
federal governments have used eminent domain in pursuit of public policy 
goals, often at the expense of the individual property owner but also to the 
benefit of purely private interests. 
While conflicts over "regulatory takings" have been a vital topic for 
scholarly discussion for the past three decades, eminent domain receives far 
less consideration.4 The Berman decision is responsible for the relative lack of 
attention to this issue. Before Berman, the judicial system played a significant 
role in reviewing government condemnations. While courts were generally 
deferential to public and private uses of eminent domain, judges frequently 
declared that a particular taking was not in the public interest. 5 Berman 
severely restricted judicial review in cases of eminent domain.6 Legal.scholars 
from perspectives as diverse as Richarq. Epstein, Bruce Ackerman, and 
Margaret Radin today view the Public Use Clause as· moribund and argue that 
government powers of eminent domain are practically limitless. 7 But the law of 
eminent domaio was, before the mid-1900s, subject to great debate-a debate 
that is being resurrected today. 
The urban renewal program played a critical. role io the. demise of the 
Public Use Clause. An effort to revitalize the city through the private 
4. The literature of regulatory takings is too voluminous to cite. For representative sources, see 
WILLIAM FISCHEL, TAKINGS, FEDERALISM AND REGULATORY NORMS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLmCS 
(1995); Richard A. Epstein. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled-Web of Expectations, 
45 STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993)� Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Andrea Peterson, The 
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I: A Critique of Current Takings Clause 
Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299 (1989); Andrea Peterson, Th€ Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying 
Principles, Part II: Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral-Justification, 78 
CAL. L. REv. 53 (1990); Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed· Why the Takings Issue is Still A Muddle, 57 
S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984); Joseph L. Sax. Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); and 
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). 
5. See discussion infra pp. 9� l3. 
6. While Berman applied only to federal takings, it has been extremely influential upon state courts. 
See Laura Mansnerus, Note·, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 409. 426 (1983). 
7. See BRUCE ACKERMAN,. PRivATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 n.S (19n); RICHARD 
EPSTE1N, TAKINGS: PRivATE PROPERTY AND THE PoWER OF EMJNENT DoMAIN 162 (1985); MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 136-37 (1993). 
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redevelopment of publicly condemned land, urban renewal was promoted by 
elites as the answer to city decline. Renewal advocates envisioned the creation 
of a futuristic metropolis, organized according to modern principles of 
planning. Building this new city required the clearance and redevelopment of 
large areas of the city. In European cities, such efforts were undertaken by 
government, but American renewal advocates opposed such centralized power. 
Instead, they argued that cities could be rebuilt privately, and they proposed the 
creation of "urban redevelopment corporations." Renewal advocates were a 
diverse group--they were real estate interests, progressive reformers, urban 
planners, politicians, and other concerned citizens-and they had divergent 
goals for the city. But they all agreed that urban revitalization required a broad 
application of the government's eminent domain powers. 
This initiative necessitated a re-imagining of the public use doctrine 
because a program that took the dwellings and businesses of private owners and 
transferred them to other private owners to build houses and commercial 
operations was, at best, legally problematic. While the law of eminent domain 
in the early twentieth century was far from consistent, many legal professionals 
believed that taking property and turning it over to others in the manner 
conceived by renewal advocates conflicted with the Public Use Clause. The 
relevant precedents stated that eminent domain could be used only where it 
provided specific benefits to the general public, and critics and supporters alike 
questioned whether urban renewal met this standard. Before urban 
revitalization could begin, the law would have to change. 
To secure political and judicial approval for their efforts, renewal advocates 
created a new language of urban decline: a discourse of blight. Blight, renewal 
proponents argued, was a disease that threatened to turn healthy areas into 
slums. A vague, amorphous term, blight was a rhetorical device that enabled 
renewal advocates to reorganize property ownership by declaring certain real 
estate dangerous to the future of the city. 8 To make the case for renewal 
programs, advocates contrasted the existing, deteriorated state of urban areas 
with the modern, efficient city that would replace them. Urban revitalization 
required the condemnation of blighted properties and the transfer of this real 
estate to developers who would use it more productively. 
By elevating blight into a disease that would destroy the city, renewal 
advocates broadened the application of the Public Use Clause and at the same 
time brought about a re-conceptualization of property rights. One influential 
understanding of property defines it as a bundle of rights, the most important 
being the rights to occupy, exclude, use, and transfer: In the urban renewal 
8. On property as rhetoric, see Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of 
Private Property, in CONSTITIITIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds., 1988); and 
Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1998). 
9. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 26-28. 
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regime, blighted properties were considered less worthy of the full bundle of 
rights recognized by American law, Property owners in blighted areas were due 
government-determined fair value for . their holdings, while tenants were 
grudgingly given relocation assistance, but they were not entitled to 
undisturbed possession. When landowners attempted to fight the condemnation 
of their properties, state supreme courts from Washington to Maine gave their 
blessing to the use of eminent domain for urban renewal. In 1954, in Berman, 
the United States Supreme Court also approved the use of eminent domain for 
such purposes, opening the door to an era of urban reconstruction that 
continues today (although the nature and scope of urban renewal efforts has 
since evolved). 
The role of the urban renewal program in reshaping the urban landscape is 
well-documented. Several studies have shown how urban elites promoted 
redevelopment to reorganize urban areas and to protect and enhance their real 
estate investments. These scholars have studied .the rise of "growth 
coalitions"10-groups of business and political leaders that promoted renewal­
and they have examined the political debates over post-war housing policy." 
Other works have documented the impact of urban renewal in intensifying 
racial segregation and limiting the mobility of African-Americans." Little work 
has been done, however, to explain how renewal advocates secured public and 
judicial support for the expansive use of eminent domain in the program. 13 
In the past two decades, several legal scholars have studied the changing 
interpretations of the Public Use Clause and the central role of the Berman case 
in this doctrine. Most students have questioned the broad interpretation of the 
Public Use Clause laid out by Justice William 0. Douglas in Berman and have 
argued for a narrower reading. Scholars claim that the courts have given too 
10. See, e.g., SCOIT GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMEruCAN CITIES: THE DILEMMA OF 
DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION (1965); JOHN MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY (1983). 
11. See, e.g., RICHARD 0. DAVIES, HOUSING REFORM DURING THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 
(1966); MARK 1 GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA, 
1933�1965 (1975); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1985); GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA: POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE 
NEW DEAL ERA (1996); JON TEAFORD, ROUGH ROAD TO RENAISSANCE: URBAN REVITALIZATION IN 
AMERICA (1990); URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY (James Q. Wilson ed., 
1966). 
12. See, e.g., RONALD H. BAYOR, RACE AND THE SHAPING OF TwENTIETH-CENTURY ATLANTA 
(1996); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETIO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-
1960 (1983); ZANE .MILLER & BRUCE TuCKER, CHANGING PLANS FOR AMERICA'S INNER CITIES: 
CINCINNATI'S OVER-THE-R.Jin.!E AND TwENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISM (1998); JOEL SCHWARTZ, THE 
NEW YORK APPROACH: ROBERT MOSES, URBAN LffiERALS AND REDEVELOPMENT OF THE INNER CITY 
(1993); THOMAS SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR 
DETROIT (I 996); JUNE MANNING THOMAS, REDEVELOPMENT AND RACE: PLANNING A FINER CITY IN 
POSTWAR DETROIT (1997). 
13,_ Robert Beauregard has examined the role of rhetoric in the understanding of urban problems. 
See ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD, VOICES OF DECLINE: THE POSTWAR FATE OF AMERICAN CITIES (1993). 
Robert Fogelson examines the rise of blight rhetoric in his-new book, DoWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL, 
1880-1950 (200 I). 
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much discretion to legislatures and administrative bodies to use eminent 
domain and that these powers have been used by interested parties to distort 
private market negotiations over coveted properties.14 These studies explore the 
application of the Berman doctrine and its role in the law of eminent domain 
today, but legal scholars have not analyzed the context in which state courts 
and the United States Supreme Court broadened their interpretation of the 
Public Use Clause. 
By examining the emergence of the urban renewal program, this Article 
highlights the role of legal consciousness in shaping urban policy.15 The elites 
who promoted urban renewal (with some exceptions) shared an ideology that 
held private property rights sacrosanct, and they were profoundly skeptical 
about governmental intervention in the economy. But, at the same time, 
renewal advocates realized that government power was necessary to secure 
their goal of urban revitalization. While a small number of urban planners were 
less reticent about increased government influence over private property, most 
renewal advocates believed that condemnation would focus on a discrete group 
of properties that they would systematically select. They did not want to 
dismantle the protections provided by the Public Use Clause so much as carve 
out an exception that, they argued, clearly served the public interest. In reality, 
the initially modest effort to secure legal authority for urban renewal paved the 
way for wide-ranging powers of condemnation. 
The stated goal of the urban renewal program was to provide a means for 
public/private partnerships in urban development. But renewal programs were 
controlled by a small number of real estate interests and politicians who used 
the power of eminent domain to reorganize urban land. Today, the 
redevelopment agencies they created, like many other "public authorities," 
remain insulated from political accountability, and they have been criticized as 
a result.16 The legal and political history of these urban redevelopment 
authorities, moreover, contributes to the history of the American administrative 
statel7 Most theories of the administrative state posit a publicly-managed 
14. See, e.g., Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny 
Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 289-90 
(2000); Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in Interest­
Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 49, 60-61 (1998); Joseph J. Lazzaroti, Public Use or Public 
Abuse, 68 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 49 (1999); Mansnerus, supra note 6; Errol E. Meidinger, The 
''Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. l, 18 (1981). For less critical 
views of judicial interpretations of the Public Use Clause, see Lawrence Berger, The Public Use 
Requirement in Eminent Domain, 51 OR. L. REV. 203,213 (1978); and Thomas Merrill, The Economics 
of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986). 
15. On the study of "legal consciousness" in history, see Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of 
Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All," 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987); and Christopher 
Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS 
lliST. 56 (1995). 
16. See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text. 
17. On the rise of the American administrative state, see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW 
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); 
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bureaucracy, created. as the result of public pressure, that regulates a discrete 
subset of the economy. Redevelopment agencies, however, complicate these 
theories because they were created to serve private .ends and were controlled by 
the interes� that created them. 18 
The role of blight terminology in restricting racial mobility has also been 
under-appreciated by legal scholars. Blight was a facially neutral. term infused 
with racial and ethnic prejudice. While it purportedly assessed the state· of 
urban infrastructure, blight was often used to de.scribe the negative impact of 
certain residents on city neighborhoods. This "scientific" method of 
understanding urban decline was used to justifY. the removal of blacks and other 
minorities from certain parts of the city. By selecting racially changing 
neighborhoods as blighted areas and designating. them for redevelopment, the 
urban renewal program enabled . institQtional and j)!)litical elites to relocate 
minority populations and entrench racial segregation. Berman was decided just 
six months after Brown v. Board of Education, 19 but while Brown receives 
more attention, Berman was equally influential in shaping American race 
relations. The urban renewal program played a crucial role in redistributing 
urban populations and creating additional: obstacles to efforts to achieve 
integration. 
The legal history of the urban renewal program also provides an example of 
the changing nature of property rights in the United States; Several influential 
scholars, particularly Joseph Sax, Carol Rose, and Laura Underkufller, have 
argued that property rights should be viewed as "evolutionary" doctrines. These 
scholars, while they differ in· their explanations of the process, agree that 
property does not have a static definition but rather reflects relationships 
between people, and between government and individuals, that have changed 
over time. Understanding the evolution of property rights requires an 
examination of the ways that people conceive of their relationship to property 
in particular historical contexts. 20 
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STAT ES (Margaret Weir et al. eds;, 1988); Michael K. 
Brown, State Capacity and Political Choice: Interpreting the Failure of the Third New Deal, in 9 
STIJDIES IN AMERICAN POUTICAL DEVELOPMENT 187 (1995); Im Katznelson & Bruce Pietrykowski-, 
Rebuihjing the American State: Evidence from the -1940s, in 5- STIJDIES IN AMERICAN PoLmCAL 
DEVELOP:MENT 301 (Karen Orren & _Stephen Skowronek 1;\ds., 1991); and Andrew A. Workman, 
Creating_ the National War Labor Board: Franklin Roosevelt and the Politics of State Building in the 
Early 1940s, 12 J. POL'YHIST. 233 (2000). 
18. On the complicated. nature of public authorities, see A. Scott Henderson. Charles Abrams and 
the Problem of the "Business .Welfare State," 9 J. PoL'Y HIST. 211 (1997); Gail Radford, William Gibbs 
McAdoo, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the Origins of the Public-Authority Model of 
Government Action, 11 J. POL'Y HIST, 59 (1999); and Keith D. Revellf Cooperation, Capture and 
AutotJomy: The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Port Authority iTt the 1920s, 12 J. POL'Y HIST. 
177 (2000) . . 
19. 347 U.S.483 (1954). 
20. See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence: 
An Evolutionary Appro(Jf:h, 5-1 TENN. L. REv. 577 (1990); -Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline 
of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983); Laura S. Underkufiler, On Property: An Essay, 100 
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This Article will examine how the interaction of renewal advocates and the 
courts changed legal conceptions of property in the middle of the twentieth 
century. Part I outlines the movement for urban renewal in the early twentieth 
century and surveys the law of takings from the early 1800s to the 1930s. Part 
II discusses the role of rhetoric in the efforts of renewal advocates to rally 
public support for urban redevelopment during the 1920s and 1930s. Part III 
describes the intimate relationship, both political and jurisprudential, between 
the New Deal public housing program and the expansion of urban renewal. Part 
IV examines the continued role of blight rhetoric in the lobbying effort to 
create urban renewal programs during the 1940s. Part V analyzes several early 
renewal projects and describes the efforts of renewal proponents to create a 
national urban renewal program. Part VI traces the acceptance of the discourse 
of blight by state courts and examines the Berman case. The Conclusion 
surveys the post-Berman expansion of public and private eminent domain 
powers and briefly discusses current debates over the public use doctrine. 
I. PROGRESSIVE ERA HOUSING REFORM AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
Fears of the "contagion" of the slums captured the attention of reformers 
throughout the 1800s. Toward the end of the century, the slum became the 
main focus of Progressive reformers. After Jacob Riis exposed the problem in 
his best-selling book, How the Other HalfLives,21 hundreds of college educated 
men and women followed him into the warrens of the poor in American cities. 
While reformers like Jane Addams looked to use the talents of the poor to 
rebuild their neighborhoods themselves, others like Lawrence Veiller sought to 
secure the powers of!ocal government to erase the slums. Veiller pushed New 
York and other cities to adopt housing regulations that he thought would force 
landlords to meet minimum maintenance standards and builders to construct 
modem dwellings.22 These laws sometimes resulted in better housing, but their 
impact in improving the slum was minimal. 23 
While there were many nineteenth century attempts to regulate working­
class housing, the first serious efforts at "slum clearance" began in New York 
City at the end of the century. After years of agitation by housing reformers, the 
state passed the Tenement House Act of 1895, which allowed the city Board of 
YALE L.J. 127 (1990). I am not arguing that these scholars share the same position on the meaning of 
property and property rights, rather that, in defining property as "evolutionary," these scholars have 
"historicized" the question. In order to analyze the changing nature of property and property rights, we 
need to understand the historical context in which these issues were debated. 
21. JACOB A. RllS, How THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS OF NEW 
YORK(1904). 
22. See THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM (Robert W. DeForest & lawrence Veiller eds., 1903); 
Lawrence Veiller, Housing Reform Through Legislation, 51 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 68 
(1914). 
23. See ROY LUBOVE, 1liE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN NEW 
YORK CITY, 1890-1917 (1962). 
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Health to condemn and demolish buildings declared unfit for human habitation. 
Progressives hoped that this legislation would eliminate the decrepit tenements 
that exacerbated the health and social problems in slum areas,. but New York's 
landlords vigorously fought the passage and enforcement of the Act. As a 
result, its ll:nplementation was inconsistent at best.24 
Housing reformers faced several major impedll:nents to clearing the slums. 
The admiuistration of a housing regulatory system required the development of 
detailed building standards for judging dilapidated housing as well as the 
employment of qualified persons to enforce these standards. Neither were 
available in the infancy of urban America's regulatory system. The biggest 
obstacle to redevelopment was the inability of housing admiuistrators to secure 
title to run-down, but frequently profitable, slum tenements. In the early 1900s, 
condemnation was a complicated, time consuming process, and conservative 
judges, as well as entrenched political corruption; frequently prevented housing 
officials from acquiring the buildings they sought. In addition; the Supreme 
Court's requirement that condemnors pay fair market value for property taken 
(not a price determined by the city) inhibited large"scale takings of slum 
property. 
Housing reformers had conflicting views on the best means to· eliminate the 
slum. Most realized that the tenement economy survived because housing was 
desperately needed by the urban poor. Destruction oftenements required the 
construction of replacement housing, but because they were strongly opposed 
to government interference with the private market, most reformers refused to 
support public housing programs. Veiller, one of the most vocal critics of 
tenements, consistently asserted that "government housing play[ s] no part in 
the solutions of housing problems. The motto of the American people," he 
argued, "is to keep the government out of private business and to keep private 
business out of government.'.25 Veiller and other housing reformers supported 
and organized private associations to purchase slum properties and redevelop 
them, but they lacked the funds needed to make a inajor impact.26 They hoped 
to secure the power of eminent domain for private redevelopment of the slum, 
but most legal scholars in the early 1900s believed that this violated the Public 
Use Clause.'7 
24. SeeMA.xPAGE, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MANliATIAN90�92 (1999). 
25. 1<1. at 91. 
26. See A. SCOIT HENDERSON, HOUSING AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT 
OF CHARLES ABRAMS 49 (2000); RADFORD, supra note ll, 
27. One effort that achieved limited success in eliminating slums was the use of what reformers 
called ••excess condemnation." Properties adjacent to those necessary for the construction of government 
projects were �en and sold to defray_the costs ofthe project. During the -construction of the Manhattan 
and Williamsburg Bridges in the early 1900s, for example, the use of excess condemnation enabled the 
city to clear 700 tenements (uprooting 50,000 people) on the Lower East Side. Excess condenmation 
was attacked as au unreasonable extension of the public use doctrine, and some courts limited its 
application. But most state supreme courts approved the process. These battles were among the earliest 
8 
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From the American Revolution through the first half of the twentieth 
century, the law .of eminent domain was full of inconsistencies. Rationalization 
of the diverse state and federal court rulings about what constituted a valid 
public use was extremely difficult. The founding fathers, moreover, left little 
guidance on the meaning of the term. Although the sovereign's right of eminent 
domain was part of natural law principles adopted by the Constitutional 
Convention from English law, little evidence exists to explain why the framers 
included the limitation that condemned land be taken solely for public use. In 
the first half of the 1800s, every state except North Carolina included a public 
use clause in its constitution, but they too provided little guidance on the 
meaning of the phrase. As a result, courts interpreted these clauses on an ad hoc 
basis. During the nineteenth century, state courts vacillated between support for 
an expansive use of eminent domain and a fear that condemnation would be 
abused to the detriment of individual property rights. The United States 
Supreme Court, moreover, infrequently expounded upon the meaning of the 
Public Use Clause, and when the Court did consider cases involving 
condemnation, its principles-private property rights were sacrosanct­
conflicted with its approval of a wide variety of condemnations. 28 
In the early Republic, eminent domain was used to support the expansion of 
the nascent economy, and many state courts adopted a broad interpretation of 
public use to support the taking of property for mills, dams, or roads, holding 
that these enterprises provided a "public benefit.''29 Even though 
condemnations of property for dams or highways frequently provided 
siguificant advantages to individual parties, courts concluded that because the 
facilities resulting from the condemnation could be exploited by a large number 
of people, they did not violate the restriction that condemned property be for 
public use. As the Industrial Revolution gathered steam, the use of the power of 
eminent domain for railroads, utilities, and other types of improvements 
increased. To support economic development, legislatures across the country 
granted private corporations the right to condemn property needed for 
expansion. As with prior condemnations, such takings were approved on the 
theory that the fruits of the takings would be available to the general public. 
According to legal historian Harry Scheiber, '"the comfort, convenience and 
efforts of urban reformers to expand the limits of the public use doctrine. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, 
at 14; Note, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain, An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 
606-07 (1949). 
28. See Meidinger, supra note 14, at 18; see also STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, CONSTRUCTING URBAN 
CULTURE: AMERICAN CITIES AND CITY PLANNING, 1800-1920, at 41 (1989); Berger, supra note 14, at 
213; Jones, supra note 14, at 289-290; Kochan, supra note 14, at 60-61. 
29. Nineteenth century judges approached questions of eminent domain, economic regulation, and 
taxation in a similar fashion, seeking to ascertain the nature of the "public interest" in each activity. The 
interconnectedness of these three areas of law was crucial to the rise of the doctrine of substantive due 
process. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 6 (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 54-55 
(1993). 
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prosperity of the people' became a principal justification in the American 
courts generally for accepting legislative detenninations that certain older 
vested rights in property must be forced to give way to the technological and 
entrepreneurial agents of progress."30 Through the Civil War, state courts 
approved a wide variety of takings.31 
Towards the end of the 1800s, an increasing number of judges attempted to 
restrict the use of eminent domain by private parties. Worried about the rise of 
"class legislation" that favored certain interests over the public good, leading 
jurists like Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Cooley argued that 
condemnation should be used only in cases of clear public benefit. In his 
seminal treatise, Constitutional Limitations, Cooley stated that a public use 
should be found only "where the g(lvernment is supplying its own needs, or is 
furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those matters of public 
necessity, convenience or welfare."32 In response to the growing power of 
corporations to secure public aid for growth, Cooley argued that "the 
distinction between different classes or occupations, and the favoring of one at 
the expense of the rest ... is not legitimate legislation. "33 This restrictive view 
of the proper application of the government's eminent domain powers placed 
many laws supporting economic development in question. In the< 1877 case 
Reyerson v. Brown, for example, Cooley declared Michigan's Milldam Act of 
1873, which allowed private companies to condemn land< for the construction of 
water-powered mills, unconstitutional and stated that private corporations could 
be given the right of eminent domain only in cases of"extreme necessity."34 
Concerned that government support for private business would be followed 
by government regulation of free enterprise, many nineteenth century judges 
invalidated attempts at public/private cooperation. In their zeal to protect 
business from government intervention, courts in the late 1800s frequently 
deprived corporations of public benefits, including fmancial subsidy and rights 
30. Harry Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the 
State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 370, 386 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 
1971). 
31. See MORTON J. HORWI TZ, THE T RANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 259--61 
(1977); SCHULTZ, supra note 28, at 89; Berger, supra note 14, at 208-09; Jones, supra note 14, at 291; 
Kochan, supra note 14, at 291-92; Meidinger, supra note 14, at 24; Harry Scheiber, Property Law, 
Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. 
HIST. 232 (1973). 
32. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATI SE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LI MI TATIONS WinCH REST UPON TilE 
LEGISLATIVEPOW EROF THES T AT ESOF THEAMERICANUNION 533 (2d ed. 1871). 
33. People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 487 (1870), c ited in GILLMAN, supra note 29, at 56. On Cooley's 
views regarding "class legislation," see Alan Jones, Thomas M Cooley and the Michigan Supreme 
Court, 1865·1886, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1966). 
34. Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 334, 339 (1 877); see also Scheiber, supra note 30, at 386. The 
Illinois Supreme Court concurred in this position. declaring that state's Mills and Millers Act of 1872 
illegal. See Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 68 N.E. 522 (Ill. 1903). Harry Scheiber argues that in the West the 
courts continued to be amenable to a broad interpretation of the Public Use Clause. Scheiber, supra note 
31, at244-47. 
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of condemnation.35 In 1888, the New York Court of Appeals voided the 
Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Railway Company's state-granted right of eminent 
domain. Citing Judge Cooley, the court declared that, while the railroad might 
provide a means for the public to "fully gratify their curiosity" in seeing the 
falls, this was not a sufficiently compelling purpose to justify the use of 
condemnation.'6 The court further argued that while it was cognizant that the 
legislature had declared such a use to benefit the public, the final determination 
of what constituted a public use remained the court's prerogative." In the late 
1800s and early 1900s, other state snpreme courts took similarly restrictive 
positions on the appropriate uses of eminent domain.38 
Most nineteenth century battles over the appropriation of land were fought 
in the state courts, which were generally ambivalent towards expansive 
interpretations of the Public Use Clause. The United States Supreme Court, 
when it considered such matters, however, was generally amenable to the use 
of eminent domain to support economic development. The Court's broad 
interpretation of the Public Use Clause was at odds with its oft-stated 
opposition to govermnent intervention in the economy.39 The 1896 case of 
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska 40 is one of the few where the Court 
viewed eminent domain with suspicion. In that case, the Court considered a 
state act that required the Missouri Pacific Railroad to allow farmers to 
construct a cooperative grain elevator on its property, declaring that to order the 
railroad to set aside its own land for such purposes violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the grain elevators would 
provide benefits to the farmers who used them rather than the general public, 
the Court reasoned, the program was unconstitutional. "[S]o far as it required 
the railroad corporation to surrender a part of its land to the petitioners," the 
law was, "in essence and effect, a taking of private property ... for the private 
use of [another]," the Court stated.41 
The Court's statement that the property of one person cannot be taken for 
the benefit of another was nsed so frequently in the early 1900s that it became 
35. See Scheiber, supra note 30, at 392. 
36. In re the Application of the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429, 432 (N.Y. 1 888). 
37. /d. 
38. See, e.g., Minn. Canal & Power v. Koochiching, 107 N.W. 414 (Minn. 1 906); R.R. Co. v. Iron 
Works, 8 S.E. 453,467 (W. Va. l 888). 
39. For a review of the late nineteenth century views of the Supreme Court, see GILLMAN, supra 
note 29, at 6-15; Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Reevaluation of the Meaning and 
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); David Gold, Recfjields, 
Railroads and the Roots of "LaissezAFaire Constitutionalism," 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254 (1983); 
Charles McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of GovernmentABusiness Relations: Some 
Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1 975). 
40. 164 u.s. 403 (1 896). 
41. !d. at 417. Later that year, the Court specifically declared that the public use provisions of the 
Fifth Amendment applied to the states. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 
(1 896); see also Meidinger, supra note 14, at 30. 
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axiomatic, but the principle was frequently honored in the breach. In spite of 
the strong language ·the Court used in declaring the Nebraska Act 
unconstitutional, it was thereafter reluctant to overrule state or federal 
condemnations. During the early twentieth century, the Justices were amenable 
to a wide variety of takings, and Missouri Pacific is the only case in which the 
Court invalidated a state-approved condemnation; Unlike other areas of 
economic regulation in which the Court continued to view legislative acts with 
suspicion, in a wide variety of cases, it ceded the authority to determine what 
constituted a public use to the state courts.42 In 1923, the Court declared that it 
would regard state court determinations regarding the Public Use Clause "with 
great respect" and concluded that its review of public use cases was 
exceedingly limited. 
43 
Rejecting the view that condemned property had to be 
available to the general public, the Court also. stated that it was "not essential 
that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly 
enjoy or participate in order. to constitute a public use!,... While the Justices 
never varied from, and stated frequently, their view that property could not be 
condemned and transferred to another party, their expansive readings of the 
Fifth Amendment gave encouragement to advocates of urban renewaL 45 
At the same time the Court was approving a wide variety of takings, it 
handed renewal advocates another tool to control urban development. In the 
1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, Justice Sutherland 
ruled that zoning codes were an acceptable government measure to shape urban 
areas and did not violate the Due· Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.46 Sutherland concluded that zoning was an acceptable method to 
control public nuisances and within the police powers of local government to 
protect the health and safety of residents. Many of the leading urban reformers, 
in particular Alfred Bettman, who wrote a persuasive amicus curiae brief on 
behalf of the Village of Euclid, would later argue that the Court's opinion 
42. For cases considering the public use doctrine, see, for example, Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel 
Improvement District, 262 U.S. 710 (1923) (state could condemn land to build tunnel for railroad); 
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (war emergency provided public purpose for statute protecting 
tenants from eviction); Hendersonville Light and Power Co. v. Blue Ridge International, 243'U.S. 563 
(1917) (company could condemn land to build power plant for street railway); Mt. Vernon�Woodbery 
Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916) (allowing power company to 
condenm land for electric project). See also Berger, supra note 14, at 213; Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 
414. 
43. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262-U.S. 700, 707 (1923). 
44. ld 
45, In the small number of cases that involved takings by the federal government, the Court also 
gave federal agencies similar broad discretion. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 
668 (1 896) (Congress could authorize condemnation of Gettysburg Battlefield); Luxton v. N. River 
Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894) (Congress could al!thoriz� condemnation of land for construction of 
bridge); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282,(1 .893) (D.C. administrator could condenm land for 
public park). 
46. Vi!L of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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supported the use of eminent domain for urban renewal.47 
While the United States Supreme Court accepted the necessity of 
government coercion in support of economic development in the early 
twentieth century, in many state courts, particularly those in the Northeast and 
Midwest (the areas with the largest, oldest cities), the doctrine of public use 
remained limited. The appellate courts of New York and Ohio continued to 
hold to a narrow interpretation of the clause and viewed with skepticism state 
legislative delegations of eminent domain powers to private parties.48<In 1 9 1 2, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in an advisory opinion, 
specifically declared that housing was not a "public use" for which public funds 
could be spent.49 The insistence of these courts that it was the judiciary's role to 
determine what constituted a public use, and their refusal to develop standards 
by which to define the doctrine, made a large-scale urban renewal scheme a 
very risky undertaking. 
But the conflicting legal precedents were not the only reason that renewal 
advocates struggled with the law of eminent domain. Equally important, the 
scheme conflicted with renewal advocates' deeply rooted conceptions of 
property rights. The principle that one person's property could not be taken and 
given to another was ingrained in their understanding of American 
jurisprudence. The Public Use Clause restrained government from abusing 
private property owners, and it was a constitutional protection against 
socialism. Renewal advocates navigated a narrow path between the Scylla of 
continued urban decline, and the Charybdis of increased govermnent influence 
over private property. They needed a method to secure government assistance 
while retaining private control over urban redevelopment and to achieve urban 
redevelopment without drastically altering legal protections for private property 
in general. The discourse of blight provided a means to achieve their goals. 
II. THE DISCOVERY OF BLIGHT 
During the 1 920s, American cities witnessed a construction boom that 
surpassed all previous periods of growth. Skyscrapers rose higher than ever, 
bridges spanned rivers across the country, and public buildings sprouted 
throughout urban areas. In addition, several million units of housing were built 
47. On the importance of Euclid in urban law, see Richard Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 597, 611-13 (2001); and Melvyn Durchslag, Village of Euclid v.  Ambler Realty 
Co., Seventy-Five Years Later: This is Not Your Father's Zoning Ordinance, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 
645 (2001). 
48. See, e.g., Little Falls Fibre Co. v. Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 229 N.Y.S. 445, 449 (App. Div. 
1928) (prohibiting construction of dam on Mohawk River); Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs., 135 N.E. 635 (Ohio 1922) (prohibiting condemnation ofland where public use was unclear); 
see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, PoLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW 
YORK, 1920-1980, at 28 (200 I). 
49. In re Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.E. 611 (Mass. 1912). 
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during the decade, allowing second generation immigrants to escape the slums. 
But while these were healthy changes,. many urban elites realized that cities 
would face trouble in the near future. The expansion of the suburbs drew the 
rich and middle-class out of the city. At the same time, the combination of 
slowed immigration and economic mobility resulted in increased vacancy rates 
in working-class districts. The number of residents in the urban core declined, 
to the joy of housing reformers, but the slums remained, impervious to 
h 50 c ange. , 
Throughout the 1920s, renewal advocates hoped that run-down 
neighborhoods, at least those close to the business and entertainment districts, 
would provide profit-making opportunities that would result in the private 
acquisition and clearance of deteriorated structures. However, instead of 
rebuilding older neighborhoods, developers focused on the outlying areas and 
the suburbs. The construction of mass transit and improvements in roads made 
these new units easily accessible, and developers generally avoided the 
problems that came with inner-city development. In New York City, for 
example, despite dramatic growth during the decade, some 67,000 substandard 
buildings remained in the city as of 1930.51 
The late 1 920s brought a convergence of forces that supported the urban 
renewal movement, and several groups that were formerly antagonists in the 
battle for city revitalization began to cooperate. Real estate interests, housing 
reformers, and big-city politicians all hoped to reap benefits through urban 
renewal, and they formed a tenuous coalition to promote redevelopment. Their 
goals were widely divergent. Housing reformers wanted government support to 
eliminate decrepit housing and replace it with modem, affordable dwellings. 
Politicians hoped to increase their cities' tax bases and provide jobs (as well as 
opportunities for graft) to their constituents. Real estate interests sought to gain 
access to large parcels of downtown property for profitable redevelopment. 52 
The planning profession provided a common language that joined real 
estate interests, housing reformers, and local government. Planners argued that 
cities were anarchic and inefficient, and they sought to rationalize the city 
through the development of strict standards for city growth. Successful city 
development, they claimed, required a professional analysis of the needs and 
resources of urban areas. During the construction boom of the 1 920s, planners 
played a major role in the development of suburban communities and, through 
professional societies like the American Institute of Planners and the American 
50. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 26. 
51. See PAGE, supra note 24, at 72�73. 
52. On the varied goals and interests of urban renewal advocates, see FOGELSON, supra note 13, at 
346-47; PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF URBAN PLANNING AND 
DESIGN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 228-29 (1996); TEAFORD, supra nOte 1 1 ,  at 26-29; and John F. 
Bauman, Visions of a Post-War City: A Perspective on Urban Planning in Philadelphia and the Nation, 
1942-1945, 6 URBANISM PAST & PRESENT, Winter/Spring, 1980-81,  at 1 .  
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Society of Planning Officials, became intimately involved in the reorganization 
of urban life 53 
Herbert Hoover's vocal support for zoning and comprehensive planning 
was crucial to the growth of the planning profession and to the rise of the urban 
renewal movement. As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover created a Special 
Division of Building and Housing, which promoted planning through the 
development of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, a model Jaw adopted 
by many states during the 1920s. The Commerce Department also published 
and distributed the City Planning Primer, which promoted the benefits of 
zoning and other types of urban planning.54 In 1 93 1 ,  Hoover convened the 
Conference on Home Building and Homeownership, an intensive study of the 
state of American housing. The thirty-one committees of the conference 
examined every aspect of the problems facing cities and suburbs. Among these 
groups was the Committee on Blighted Areas and Slums, which promoted its 
plan for urban redevelopment as "a combination of governmental aid in the 
clearing of sites and of private enterprise in rebuilding upon them . . . .  "55 This 
plan would require the passage of "enabling legislation that will permit and 
facilitate the large-scale condemnation of slum areas," the committee 
reported 56 
Urban planners like Alfred Bettman, Harland Bartholomew, and John 
Ihlder, and real estate interests including Metropolitan Life Insurance President 
Frederick Ecker and Leonard Reaume, former president of the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards, were active participants in this conference, 
and they shaped discussions over the future of American housing. They formed 
a powerful, nation-wide coalition to fight for slum clearance. The influence of 
planners also continued to rise as the New Deal established agencies like the 
National Resources Planning Board (run by urban planner Frederic Delano, 
President Roosevelt's cousin), which funded the preparation of local and 
regional plans. 
This coalition worked to foster a political climate amenable to the radical 
reconstruction of urban areas. Led by the planners in the group, they gradually 
developed a new terminology of city decline, a discourse of blight and renewal. 
53. On the rise of the planning profession, see M. CHRISTINE BOYER, DREAMING THE RATIONAL 
CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 206 (1983); HALL, supra note 52, at 136-75; MEL 
SCOTI, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 397-400 (1971); and Robert Beauregard, Between 
Modernity and Postmodernity: The Ambiguous Position of US. Planning, 7 ENV'T & PLAN. D: Soc'Y & 
SPACE 381, 388 (1989). 
54. On Hoover's role, see Janet Hutchinson, Shaping Housing and Enhancing Consumption: 
Hoover's Interwar Housing Policy, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN 
URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TwENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 8 1  (John F. Bauman et al. eds., 2000). See 
also Chused, supra note 47, at 598-99; Radford, supra note 1 1 ,  at 86. 
55. PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HO:MEOWNERSHIP, 3 SLUMS, LARGE­
SCALE HOUSING AND DECENTRALIZATION 25 (John M. Gries & James Ford eds., 1932). 
56. ld at xii. 
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This discourse contrasted the existing, deteriorated state of urban areas with a 
possible modern, revitalized future. Vital to this effort was the elevation of two 
terms to public attention: "slums" and "blight." Advocates worked to convince 
urban residents that these problems would continue to plague cities without 
government intervention. In book after book, including Mabel Walker's Slums 
and Blight, and Edith Elmer Wood's Slums andBlighted Areas, as well as in 
professional journals like American Planning and Civic Annual, Architectural 
Record, .  and National-Municipal Review, planners developed an increasingly 
complex lexicon of terms to describe these phenomena and explained why they 
plagued cities. A slum, according to planners, was an area with run-down 
buildings, dirty streets, and a high crime rate . .  that was almost exclusively 
inhabited by poor people. While the popular view of the slums focused on the 
inhabitants, planners concentrated on the conditions that created such areas. 
Accordiog to the experts, a slum was a district that had an excess of buildings 
that "either because of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, poor 
arrangement or design, lack of ventilation;· light or sanitary facilities, or a 
combination of these factors; are detrimental to the safety, health, morals and 
comfort of the inhabitants. thereof. "57 A slum . was a "social liability to the 
community" because it spawned crime and other problems. 58 
Other urban areas did not meet the definition of a slum, but they were 
"blighted." The term was first used by the Chicago school of sociology. 
Founded in the Progressive era, the Chicago school was led by Robert Park, 
Ernest Burgess, and R.D. McKenzie, .and. produced an impressive amount of 
scholarship that focused in particular on the problems of the poor in cities. 
These scholars introduced the "ecological approach" to the field of sociology, 
and this method of study was crucial to early twentieth century understandings 
of urban change. Blight, originally used to describe plant diseases, was a part of 
this broader approach to understanding society.59 Cities were . like living 
organisms, the Chicago school argued, and, therefore, urban change occurred in 
natural patterns. Blight arose around the central business district, in areas that 
were formerly residential. As cities expanded, these areas became mixed use 
districts, with industry and commerce. 60 The formerly attractive housiog was 
57. MABEL WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 3 ( 1936). 
58. ld. at 3 (1935). On the role of discourse in shaping policies towards cities, see CHRISTOPHER 
MELE, SELLING THE LoWER EAST SIDE: CULTIJRE, REAL ESTATE AND RESISTANCE IN NEW YORK CITY 
(2000). 
59. See LEONARD REISSMAN, THE URBAN PROCESS: CITIES IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 93-121 
(1964); Ernest Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project, in THE CITY 47 
(Robert E. Park et al. eds., 1925); Roderick D. McKenzie, The Ecological Approach to the Study of the 
Human Community, in THE CITY 63 (Ernest Burgess et al. eds., 1925). 
60. Scholars like Homer Hoyt argued that these areas became blighted because property owners 
expected the central business district to expand. OWners let their properties decline because they thought 
that they would be demolished after they were bought for redevelopment HOMER HoYT, ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS OF-LAND VALUES rN CHICAGO 364 (1936). 
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divided into smaller units for the poor, and "parasitic and transitory services" 
such as flophouses proliferated.61 
In periods of migration, these areas were "invaded" by ethnic and racial 
minorities in search of affordable housing. This use of medical terminology by 
the Chicago school made its analysis appear objective and scientific, but it also 
reflected the general prejudices of society regarding racial minorities, 
particularly blacks. In his discussion of Chicago, Burgess noted the 
"disturbances of metabolism caused by an excessive increase [in population] 
such as those which followed the great influx of southern Negroes" into the city 
after World War 1.62 These waves of people caused a "speeding up of the 
junking process in the area of deterioration."63 Another study, which 
acknowledged that many areas occupied by blacks had other unattractive 
features, concluded that "certain racial and national groups . . .  cause a greater 
physical deterioration of property than groups higher in the social and 
economic scale.'
,64 Blight, therefore, may have been a naturally occurring 
process, but racial minorities were central to the Chicago school's 
understanding of urban change. 
For urban planners and other renewal advocates, the theory of urban 
ecology became a means of reorganizing property rights within the city. Not 
surprisingly, planners argued that blight was caused by lack of planning. 
"Unguided urban growth" and an "indiscriminate mixture of homes, factories, 
warehouses, junk yards, and stores that has resulted in depressed property 
values" were responsible for urban blight.65 Buildings in these areas were 
"obsolete" because "an excessive amount of land is devoted to streets and 
alleys. "66 The streets in these districts, which were built for horses, had "now 
become motor speedways."67 Population densities in these areas were higher 
than acceptable under "principles of modern planning."68 All of these problems 
were the result of "unplanned urban expansion" without appropriate zoning. 69 
To renewal advocates, blight was bad not only because of.the damage it caused 
to residents, but also because it drained urban resources. The increasing costs of 
police and social services in these areas, combined with the Joss of tax revenues 
as people left the city, placed a significant burden on government. 70 
61. McKenzie, supra note 59, at 76. 
62. Burgess, supra note 59, at 54. 
63. ld. 
64. HOYT, supra note 60, at314. 
65. MEL SCOTT, METROPOLITAN LoS ANGELES: 0NEC0MMUNI1Y 108 (1950). 
66. ARTHUR HILLMAN & ROBERT CASEY, TOMORROW'S CHICAGO 70 (1950). 
67. ld. 
68. ld. 
69. !d. 
70. See EDITH ELMER WOOD, SLUMS AND. BLIGHTED AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES 19-21 (1935). 
For discussions of the general chacteristics of slums and blighted areas, see BEAUREGARD, supra note 
13, at 136-37; MILES COLEAN, RENEWING OUR CITIES 38-39 (1953); JAMES FORD. SLUMS AND 
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Renewal advocates never developed a systematic process by which to 
determine when an area was blighted. While they devoted a great deal of study 
to blighted areas, renewal advocates preferred to define the phenomenon with 
vague generalities. Hoover's slum committee, for example, declared that "a 
blighted area is an area where, due either to the lack of a vitalizing factor or to 
the presence of a devitalizing factor, the life· of the area has been sapped."71 
Hoover's committee, however, did concede that in some cases "a slum has 
become economically profitable because of the high rents that can be obtained 
for improper use, and is not long blighted according to the definition." 
Nevertheless, the area was still a problem, the committee argued. In fact, 
"because of this economic strength, it is a greater danger to the community," 
they declared. 72 
In popular discussions of the issue, renewal advocates often merged their 
descriptions of slums and blighted areas. This served useful political and 
judicial purposes because slums were known problems. Frequently, planners 
argued that a blighted area was one "on its way to becoming a slum."73 The fear 
of the slums provided planners an argument for their attempts to take control of 
blight. As the term originally described plant diseases, the evocation of blight 
created a vision of a plague spreading across the city, moving from one 
neighborhood to the next. The future of the city rested upon the effort to stop its 
spread. For this reason, renewal advocates asserted, these areas had to be 
cleared and rebuilt. "We must cut out the whole cancer and not leave any 
diseased tissue," stated New York City Comptroller Joseph McGoldrick.74 
Because the term was so poorly defined, blight became a useful rhetorical 
device-a means by which real estate interests could reorganize property 
ownership by separating "productive" and "unproductive" land uses. The 
development of the discourse of blight provided real estate investors with a 
means to rationalize urban land ownership. In the early 1900s, the majority of 
rental properties in large American cities were owned by individuals (many of 
them immigrants). Landlords typically owned just a few properties and 
frequently did not have the resources to maintain or improve them. These small 
landholdings were inefficient, developers argued, and they prevented the 
HOUSING 1 1  (1936); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOUSING OFFICIALS, HOUSING OFFICIALS YEARBOOK 
1936, at241 (Coleman Woodburyed., 1936); and WALKER, supra note 57, at4-6. 
71.  PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOMEBUILDING AND HOMEO\VNERSillP, supra note 55, at 4l .  
72. ld at 2. 
73. WALKER, supra note 57, at 4; see also GELFAND, supra note 1 1 ,  at 109. 
74. Joseph D. McGoldrick, The Superblock Instead of Slums, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 19, 1944, at 
54-55, cited in Howard Gillette, The Evolution of Neighborhood Planning: From the Progressive Era to 
the 1949 Housing Act, 9 J. URB. HIST. 421, 437 (1983). On the use of language to shape policies towards 
urban areas, see ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD 
INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (1995); and MELE, supra note 58, at 20-
22. 
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production of modem, large-scale housing and commercial projects 75 Real 
estate development was an emerging field in the 1 920s, when mortgage bankers 
and institutional investors expanded their role in housing production 
dramatically in the suburbs and outlying areas of the city 76 Many institutional 
investors saw potential in the urban core, but because they faced 
insurmountable obstacles to securing title to property in congested urban areas, 
redevelopment of slum areas stagnated, Eminent domain, therefore, was sought 
as a necessary means for the efficient accumulation ofurban property. 
Realtors, developers, and mortgage bankers were served by the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) in their efforts to secure access to 
urban land. Formed in 1908 to professionalize the selling of real estate, the 
NAREB subsequently expanded into many other areas of property 
development, and by the 1 930s, it was one of the most powerful interest groups 
in the nation. The real estate executives who led the group were instrumental in 
the creation of new methods of real estate finance and insurance, and as the 
originators of planned suburban communities, they were vital to the growth of 
the field of planning. Led by Herbert Nelson during the 1 930s and '40s, the 
group promoted a variety of programs to privately redevelop urban 
neighborhoods. The NAREB was aided in this effort by its research wing, the 
Urban Land Institute (ULI), described by its director, Hugh Potter, as "the city 
planning department of the Realtors of this country."77 Together, the NAREB 
and ULI used the language of planning to persuade the public to support the use 
of eminent domain for private redevelopment. 
As real estate interests became increasingly active in the promotion of 
urban redevelopment, Nelson and other renewal advocates shifted the analysis 
of blighted areas towards economic concerns. The problem with blighted areas 
was not only that they might become slums with their concomitant social 
problems. More importantly, blighted areas were obstacles to the economic 
growth of the city. "A blighted area is one which has deteriorated from an 
economic standpoint and therefore become less profitable to the city, the 
general public and the owners of its real estate. Depreciation has set in and the 
area is rapidly becoming a liability rather than an asset," argued planner Mabel 
Walker.78 Blight prevented the creation of a modem city, and blighted areas 
were extremely difficult and expensive to cure. The problem, renewal 
75. See JARED N. DAY, URBAN CASTI.ES: TENEMENT HOUSING AND LANDLORD ACTIVISM IN NEW 
YORK CiTY, 1890-1943, at 178 (1999). 
76. On the rise of the real estate industry, see MARC WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY 
BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL EST ATE INDUS1RY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING (1987). 
77. Hugh Potter, The Need for Federal Action in Rebuilding Cities, in 14 AMERICAN PLANNING & 
CMC ANNUAL 175, 175 (Harlean James ed., 1943); see also WEISS, supra note 76, at 50-51 (discussing 
conflicts within NAREB between real estate brokers and conununity builders); Gillette, supra note 74, 
at 434 (discussing role ofNAREB and ULI in promoting urban redevelopment efforts). 
78. WALKER, supra note 57, at 6-7. 
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advocates asserted, was that property owners often were unaware of the decline 
of property values in their neighborhood, and there was a resulting 
"discrepancy between the value placed upon the property by the owner and its 
value for any uses to which it can be put. "79 Owners, they argued, held on to 
their properties "in the hope that by some miracle they may eventually get back 
at least their original investment. "80 These "artificially high values," set by 
naive (or speculative) property owners, made acquisition and clearance very 
difficult. 81 
Ethnic prejudice underlay much of the analysis of blighted areas, 
particularly in New York City, where the majority of owners of apartment 
buildings and small-scale commercial operations were immigrants. For 
immigrant Jews and Italians, most of whom lacked formal education, tenement 
ownership was a popular means of upward mobility, as was the operation of 
garment factories and other businesses with low capital requirements. The 
tenements they owned were often the oldest and most decrepit, and immigrant 
landlords' neglect of these buildings was, according to one scholar, "a central 
management principal" designed to lower costs and maximize profits. 
82 
Undercapitalized immigrant businesses also presented problems to urban elites 
in their efforts to manage the city. While tenements were crucial to the housing 
of the immigrant masses and small businesses were vital to their economic 
survival, urban elites blamed apartment and industrial facilities for the creation 
ofblight.83 
Small-scale, inuuigrant property owners, renewal advocates argued, were 
not interested in the broader good of the city. They were speculators, persons 
whose only goal was to make a fast buck regardless of the damage they did to 
surrounding property values. "In certain spots," argued ULI President Hugh 
Potter, "the high prices at which slum areas are held reveal the influence of 
greed; the properties have been milked for years without repair."84 Because 
these immigrant landlords were inefficient and their interests speculative, their 
79. !d at 7; see also GUY GREER, YOUR CITY TOMORROW 103 (1947). 
80. WALKER, supra note 57, at 6-7. 
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property rights were not worthy of the same level of respect. Eminent domain 
would pay them "fair value" and return the property to those who would use it 
productively. In 1933, Herbert Nelson called for a "model state law helpfully 
outlining a legal device for empowering proper units to rule out adverse uses 
and effectively replan blighted areas."85 Despite the obtuse wording of his 
proposal, Nelson clearly envisioned expanded use of eminent domain for 
redevelopment. 
The purpose behind the designation of certain areas as blighted was clear. 
Renewal advocates believed that the blighted land could be put to a "higher 
use" under the right circumstances. One planner cited mid-town Manhattan as 
an example of an area where "the height of the land, the frontage on the river, 
and the growing transportation accessibility would make it a desirable location, 
if it were not for the slum characteristics it has acquired."86 Many blighted 
areas supported viable businesses and provided affordable housing to working­
class persons. The problem with a blighted area, however, was that it was not 
profitable enough-it did not produce enough tax revenues for the city, and it 
did not create profit opportunities for those who most coveted the land. As 
sociologist Scott Greer explained in his 1965 assessment of the urban renewal 
program, the definition of blight was "simply that 'this land is too good for 
these people. "'87 
The changing terminology used to describe cities set the stage for the 
implementation of urban renewal. Through the creation and explication of the 
problem of blight, renewal advocates shifted the terms of the debate. The rights 
of private property remained sacrosanct, but subject to new limitations. Not all 
property owners were due the same respect. Those who held onto blighted 
properties were acting against the public interest because their speculation and 
inefficient management imperiled city residents and taxed the finances of city 
government. Furthermore, the refusal of these owners to sell their properties at 
"reasonable prices" prevented the rationalization of urban real estate and the 
creation of modem cities. "It is a public use," D.C. reformer John !hider 
declared in 1936, "to reclaim a slum or blighted area that is proving a 
disastrous economic and social liability to its cornmunity."88 To prevent further 
damage to urban areas, eminent domain was necessary to wrest this land away 
from these owners and to ensure that it was used more appropriately. 
85. Herbert Nelson, Urban Housing and Land Use, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 158, 165 (1934). 
86. WALKER, supra note 57, at 12; see also COLEAN, supra note 70, at 79. 
87. GREER, supra note 10, at 31;  see also GELFAND, supra note 1 1, at 108; TEAFORD, supra note 
II, at 6. Hoover's committee on slums and blighted areas from the outset envisioned "the use of former 
slum sites for the housing of higher income groups." PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING 
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 55, at 9. 
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Ill. PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL 
The Great Depression provided the context for the beginnings of the 
reconceptualization of the Public Use Clause, as the development of public 
housing helped to legitimate urban renewal efforts. In 1 934, at a time when 
urban issues were considered particularly pressing, the first volume of Law and 
Contemporary Problems devoted a special section to the question of urban 
revitalization. Assessing the need to clear slum areas, Coleman Woodbury, then 
Secretary of the Illinois State Housing Board, asserted that "those who see 
housing as a major economic activity of the next generation will breathe more 
easily if and when a few high state courts and the United States Supreme Court 
clearly recognize housing as a public use." Until then, he concluded, "housing 
development will go ahead very slowly . . . .  "89 
The Great Depression devastated tenement landlords. Vacancies increased, 
taxes rose, and new housing regulations increased maintenance costs. Most 
tenements were bought on credit, and because many had changed hands in the 
heated real estate market of the 1 920s, mortgage payments on many properties 
exceeded their income. As a result, tenement owners were not able to make 
their loan payments. Many tenement owners lost their properties at foreclosure, 
and institutional investors, along with city governments, became de facto slum 
lords in many cities. 90 
This crisis, however, created new opportunities for renewal advocates. 
Many tenements were demolished because they were declared unsafe according 
to recently established minimum standards of occupancy. In addition, the 
consolidation of tax-delinquent buildings in the hands of corporations and 
government made the clearance of large areas for redevelopment possible. 
Property owners became increasingly amenable to condemnation as a means to 
exit a failing market. Where they once opposed any government regulation, 
landlords now wanted to be "bailed out" of their troubled investments. In 
addition, the creation of the Homeowner's Loan Corporation, the Federal 
Housing Administration, and other federal programs to support the real estate 
industry further supported the rationalization of the real estate market. Large 
corporations increasingly supplanted individual investors as owners of 
apartment buildings. As a result, opportunities for large-scale redevelopment of 
urban areas expanded.91 
The acquisition of property by institutional investors also intensified the 
push for government intervention in the real estate market. During the 1 930s, 
renewal advocates devised a variety of schemes to clear blighted areas. The 
89. Coleman Woodbury, Land Assembly for Housing Developments, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
213,215 (1934). 
90. See DAY, supra note 75, at 174-78. 
91. See Gabaccia, supra note 83, at 246. 
22 
The "Public Menace" of Blight 
Urban Land Institute (ULI), for example, proposed the creation of private 
redevelopment agencies to spur redevelopment through slum condemnation 
conducted by private corporations. Under the ULI plan, when these bodies 
garnered the support of 75% of the owners in a designated area, the city could 
condemn the land and pass it on to the agency.92 Many government officials, 
however, opposed such a wholesale transfer of government power to private 
corporations and raised constitutional complaints over the appropriate uses of 
eminent domain. In response, the real estate lobby altered its proposal to 
envision a limited role for government in the redevelopment process and 
proposed the creation of publicly managed "urban land commissions" to select 
sites and condemn properties. The public agency, according to the plan, would 
then have responsibility to dispose of the land to public or private entities.93 
This proposal also languished, however, as renewal advocates continued to face 
legal and political opposition. A significant urban renewal program would not 
be implemented until the 1 940s 94 
Violently opposed by real estate interests, public housing became, 
ironically, the wedge for the expansion of slum clearance. Through the efforts 
of director Harold Ickes, the Public Works Administration (PWA) implemented 
the nation's first significant public housing program, and between 1934 and 
1 937, the PWA constructed more than 2 1 ,000 units of publicly-owned housing 
for the working-class.95 To secure support for the program, Ickes agreed that 
slum sites would be given priority for public housing developments.96 This 
would enable real estate investors (particularly mortgage companies) to relieve 
themselves of underperforrning properties. Many housing reformers had pushed 
for working-class housing in the suburbs and outlying areas of cities, believing 
that these healthier surroundings would improve the social conditions of the 
urban poor. Development in less densely populated areas would also be cheaper 
and would allow the construction of more units. But Ickes believed that public 
housing could provide shelter to the working-class and revitalize slums at the 
same time. From that point on, public housing and urban renewal would be 
intimately related 97 
Despite Ickes's efforts to limit the real estate lobby's opposition, the public 
92. GELFAND, supra note 1 1 ,  at 113�15. 
93. See BOYER, supra note 53, at 252-53; GREER, supra note 79, at 107-08; LOUlS JUSTEMENT, 
NEW CITIES FOR OLD: CITY BUILDING IN TERMS OF SPACE, TIME, AND MONEY 29-30 (1946); URBAN 
LAND INSTITUTE, A PROPOSAL FOR REBUILDING BLIGHTED CITY AREAS (1943); Urban Development 
Principles Restated, 6 URB. LAND, Mar. 1947, at 3. 
94. Land clearance in cities, however, did increase dramatically during the New Deal, as local 
governments, funded by the Public Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration, 
implemented public projects like bridges, tunnels, and other government facilities. These projects 
dislocated thousands of city residents. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 4647. 
95. See RADFORD, supra note 1 1 ,  at 100-01. 
96. See id. at 101-02. 
97. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 25-26; Carol Aronivici, Housing the Poor: Mirage or Reality, 
I LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 148 (1934). 
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housing program quickly came under legal attack. In the early battles over the 
New Deal, as conservative courts struggled to rein in the Roosevelt 
Administration, the government's eminent domain powers were once again 
contested. In 1935, a federal district judge in western Kentucky ruled that 
public housing did not meet the requirements of the Public Use Clause and 
denied the PW A the right to condemn land for housing projects:' Relying on 
late nineteenth century precedents, the judge construed the Public Use Clause 
narrowly and concluded that the agency could only condemn property for 
facilities that provided equal access to all citizens.99 Public housing, with a 
lintited number of units and a detailed screening process for tenants, did not 
meet this requirement. 
If the property of the citizen can be condemned and taken . . .  simply because the 
legislative department . . .  may determine that the use to which this property is to be 
put is for the general welfare, the property of every citizen in this country would be 
b. th hi d th . f . . 100 su �ect to e w ms an eones o any temporary maJonty. 
The court further commented that a broad interpretation of the Clause 
would inevitably make the courts the arbiters of public use, denying the right of 
legislatures to make policy. "The action of the courts in such cases would 
inevitably reflect the individual views of the judges." Better, he concluded, to 
have "a fixed and definite guide."101 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the holding, concluding that "the taking of one 
citizen's property for the purpose of improving it and selling or leasing it to 
another . . .  is not, in our opinion, within the scope of the powers of the federal 
government. "102 While public housing officials wanted to contest the issue in 
the Supreme Court, President Roosevelt's advisors decided not to pursue the 
case further. Government officials worried that the case would provide an 
opportunity for the conservative Supreme Court to gut much of the economic 
recovery effort. As a result, the federal program was limited to projects that the 
PW A could build without the use of eminent domain.103 
The year following the ruling, Congress passed the Wagner Housing Act, 
which created the United States Housing Authority and replaced federal 
construction with a system of subsidy for local housing authorities.104 The Act 
caused a dramatic expansion in public housing across the nation, as almost 
98. United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (1935), aff'd, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 
1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 (1936). 
99. !d. at 140. 
100. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. at 138; see also HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 71�72; 
Ira S. Robbins, The Use of Eminent Domain for Housing Purposes, in HOUSING OFFICIALS YEARBOOK 
1936, at 1 1 6  (Coleman Woodbucy ed., 1936). 
101. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. at 139. 
I 02. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F .2d at 688. 
103. See HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 71; RADFORD, supra note 1 1, at 103. 
l04. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 11,  50 Stat. 893 (1937) (current version at 42 
u.s.c. § 1437 (1994)). 
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every state approved legislation authorizing the creation of local housing 
authorities to secure federal funding. The bill also supported the goals of 
renewal advocates by specifically linking public housing construction to slum 
clearance and requiring each housing authority to demolish or repair as many 
"substandard" units as it built.105 
Public housing was also attacked in state courts, but unlike the Sixth 
Circuit, most state judges gave wide discretion to local agencies to use eminent 
domain for public housing. As it did in many areas of twentieth century legal 
reform, New York led the way in reinterpreting the Public Use Clause 106 The 
state had authorized a public housing program before the passage of the 
Wagner Act, and the newly created New York City Housing Authority 
(NYCHA) fought the legal battles over eminent domain concurrently with the 
WPA. In a holding that contrasted distinctly with the Sixth Circuit, New York's 
Court of Appeals approved the condemnation of properties by the NYCHA. 
The court relied heavily on the argument that slum clearance was an integral 
part of public housing production and declared that "slum areas are the 
breeding places of disease which take toll not only on its denizens, but, by 
spread, from the inhabitants of the entire city and state."107 The elimination of 
these areas through the construction of public housing, the court ruled, 
constituted a valid public purpose. 
Other courts followed New York's direction in approving the use of 
condemnation for public housing, and slum clearance played an important role 
in many of these cases. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated that if the 
construction of housing for low-income persons were the "sole object of the 
statute we might have more difficulty."108 But the court distinguished the 
state's public housing act from prior attempts to subsidize housing that it had 
rejected. An earlier proposed statute, the court argued, "contained no provision 
for the eradication of the sources of disease and danger. It was not a slum 
clearance law.''109 Because slums were a "public nuisance," the court concluded 
that their destruction was a valid use of eminent domain.110 
In authorizing the condemnation of land for public housing, state courts 
shifted public use jurisprudence. In most prior cases, courts had examined the 
105. Jd. ; see also RADFORD, supra note 1 1 ,  at 103. 
106. On New York's central role in changing interpretations of the Public Use Clause and other 
legal doctrines, see NELSON, supra note 48. 
107. N.Y. City Housing Auth. v. Muller, l N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1936); see also HEJ\'DERSON, 
supra note 26, at 72� 75; NELSON, supra note 48, at 258-59. 
108. Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Auth., 23 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Mass. 1939). 
109. I d. at 669. 
1 10. !d.; see also Doman v. Phila. Housing Auth., 200 A. 834, 841 (Penn. 1934) ("[T]he 
elimination of unsafe and dilapidated tenements is a legitimate object for the exercise of the police 
power."). Public housing cases are cited in Stephen A. Reisenfeld & Warren Eastlund, Public Aid to 
Housing and Land Redevelopment, 34 MINN. L. REV. 610, 634�35 (1950). See also Meidinger, supra 
note 14, at 33-34. 
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intended future use of the condemned property and determined whether that use 
was in the public interest. In Muller and its progeny, courts looked instead to 
the state of the property before condemnation. Since the destruction of 
tenements and other substandard buildings would eliminate noxious conditions 
in the area, courts reasoned, eminent domain provided a public benefit. By 
altering their methods for determining what constituted a public use, courts 
lessened the importance of the ultimate disposition of the property in their 
considerations. This shift would be crucial in considerations of the legality of 
urban renewal. 1 1 1 
The approval of local public housing by state courts provided strong 
precedents for urban renewal advocates who wanted to exercise the powers of 
eminent domain for the benefit of private developers. Public housing, however, 
was not identical to the programs promoted by renewal advocates. Unlike 
renewal efforts driven by private real estate interests, public housing projects 
would be owned by local govermnent and leased to tenants. While public 
housing opinions were favorable to the cause, urban renewal required a further 
expansion of the public use doctrine. World War H-era concerns about the 
future of American society provided a platform for promoting such change. 
IV. PLANNING A MODERN CITY 
During the Great Depression, planners secured a prominent position in 
discussions over the economic and social development of the country. The 
Tennessee Valley Authority was only the largest of many significant 
development projects in which planners played an important role. During 
World War II, national planning took on still greater urgency, and federal 
agencies presented numerous post-war plans for the creation of new systems of 
transportation, sanitation, and the development of natural resources. Through 
the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) as well as state, regional, and 
local planning cormnissions, planners lobbied for comprehensive programs to 
reorganize cities, suburbs, and rural areas. "The war has given a new intensity 
to thinking about the future of cities," argued NRPB Chair Charles Ascher. 
"Let us not quail before the magnitude of the task."1 12 
The movement for comprehensive planning received a boost from 
1 1 1 .  Though the Court of Appeals did not cite it, the Muller decision is similar in its reasoning to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). There, the Court approved a 
Virginia law that directed owners of red cedar trees to cut them down in order to protect the state's apple 
orchards from the "cedar rust" disease. 
112. Charles Ascher, Better Cities After the War, 57 THE AM. CITY, June 1942, at 55. For more on 
post-war planning and redevelopment efforts, see NAT'L RESOURCES PLAN. BD., NATIONAL RESOURCES 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR 1943 (1943); NAT'L RESOURCES PLAN. BD., POST-WAR PLANNING ( 1942); 
W.E. REYNOLDS, POST-WAR URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (1946); SCOIT, supra note 53, at 397-400; City 
Planning Merges into National Planning, 48 THE AM. CITY, Nov. 1939, at 65; and Frederic A. Delano, 
Must Urban Redevelopment Wait on Bombing?, 56 THE AM. CITY, May 1941, at 35. 
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economists worried that the end of the war would push the economy back into 
depression. During the conflict, Harvard economist Alvin Hansen and Federal 
Reserve advisor Guy Greer published several influential reports in which they 
argued that the nation needed a full-scale plan for post-war conversion to 
maintain employment levels and prevent economic crisis. Hansen and Greer 
focused in particular on slum clearance and urban redevelopment as methods to 
keep workers busy after the war. They recommended that each city and region 
develop a "Master Plan" for its area.m Seconding the proposal, Ascher argued 
that after the war ended the country could "seize what may be a unique 
opportunity to remold our cities, to provide a creative, healthful and satisfYing 
living and working environment for a people afforded economic security by 
full employment."114 The creation of a modern city, Hansen argued, required 
"far-reaching changes in state laws" to give cities "adequate legal power . . .  to 
control the use of their land areas." These changes were to be "brought about 
mainly by the pressure of public opinion."115 
During the 1 940s, renewal advocates took their case to the public. In 
pamphlets, radio addresses, "futurarnas," and other media, they argued that 
cities could be revitalized through public/private partnerships. These programs, 
with the use of eminent domain, would provide public benefits by eliminating 
the decrepit urban core and replacing it with a gleaming modern city. Cities 
across the country organized commissions to prepare blueprints for the post­
World War II era. Some, including Cincinnati, Portland, Dallas, and Detroit, 
drafted comprehensive plans for their cities. These documents established 
zoning districts, created stronger building standards, recommended changes in 
city infrastructure, and sought to create an orderly system for future growth. 116  
While some cities approved master plans, others like New York drafted more 
practical initiatives of public works aimed at renewing slum areas while 
providing construction jobs. Business leaders, politicians, and plarming 
professionals cooperated in this process, and their efforts were promoted by 
private coalitions of civic leaders such as the Allegheny Conference in 
Pittsburgh, the Municipal Housing and Plarming Council of Chicago, and the 
Citizen's Council on City Planning in Philadelphia (CCCP). These groups were 
controlled by the economic elite of each city, and their goal was to protect their 
urban investments by securing public support for government-assisted 
113. See ALVIN H. HANSEN & GUY GREER, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING (1945). 
114. Ascher, supra note 1 12,at55. 
1 15. Alvin H. Hansen, The City of the Future, 32 NAT'LMUN. REv. 68, 70 (1943). 
116. For examples of master plans, see ROBERT E. ALEXANDER & DRAYTON S. BRYANT, 
REBUILDING A CITY: A STUDY OF REDEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN LOS ANGELES (1951); EDWARD M. 
BASSETT, THE MAsTER PLAN (1938); CINCINNATI CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, THE CINCINNATI 
METROPOLITAN MASTER PLAN (1948); DETROIT CITY PLAN COMMISSION, THE DETROIT MASTER PLAN 
(1951); GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES (1942); and T.J. KENT, 
JR., THE URBAN GENERAL PLAN (1964). 
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But businessmen were not the only advocates of renewal. Liberal groups 
were active participants in this project. The CCCP, founded in 1 943 to 
"facilitate citizen participation in city planning and to further the science of city 
planning in Philadelphia," included in its membership the Association of 
Philadelphia Settlements, the Central Labor Union, the Inter-racial Committee 
of Germantown, and the local branch of the NAACP. Civic associations across 
the country promoted a revitalization program in which local agencies 
condemned properties, cleared them, and turned them over to private entities 
for redevelopment. These proposals required significant subsidies to be viable, 
and city leaders lobbied local, state, and federal governments to fund their 
programs. 1 1 8  
To gamer public aid, urban elites took several steps. In New York City, 
Mayor LaGuardia took to the radio and the stnrnp to promote his postwar 
public works program. "There will always be a New York City," LaGuardia 
stated, and, therefore, planning for the postwar period was "of the utmost 
importance."1 19 In several cities, including Chicago and Detroit, renewal 
advocates sponsored forums and advertising campaigns aimed at eliciting 
resident backing. One of the most dynamic tactics to rouse public interest was 
sponsored by the CCCP. In 194 7, the group created the "Better Philadelphia 
Exhibit," a multi-media presentation of its vision for a modem city. Thousands 
of people paid a dollar each to visit the exhibit at Gimbel's department store. 
There they saw designs for modem housing, read plans for updated 
infrastructure, and listened to testimony from public officials in support of 
Philadelphia's rebirth. The most popular part of the exhibit was a scale model 
of downtown Philadelphia, a vision of the city in the year 2000 that featured 
modem buildings, transportation, and residences.120 
In many cities, advocates published pamphlets to educate the public on the 
need for urban renewal and comprehensive planning. Two such documents 
were Metropolitan Los Angeles, written by Mel Scott, and Tomorrow 's 
Chicago, by Arthur Hillman and Robert Casey. 121 Both pamphlets were 
supported by local elites-Metropolitan Los Angeles was funded by the John 
Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation and Tomorrow 's Chicago by the 
Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council and the Field Foundation-and 
1 17. See TEAFORD, supra note 1 1 ,  at 50. 
1 1 8. Se,e id at 51-52. 
1 19. N.Y. CITY PLAN. COMM'N, PROPOSED POSTWAR WORKS PROGRAM FOR THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK ii (1942); see also N.Y. OFF. OF THE CITY CONSTR. COORDINATOR, PuBLIC WORKS PROGRAM: 
PROGRESS REPORT AS OF JANUARY l ,  1949 (1949); NEW YORK ADVANCING (Rebecca B. Rankin ed., 
1945). 
120. See TEAFORD, supra note 1 1 ,  at 52; JOHN BAUMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING, RACE, AND RENEWAL: 
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they sought to foster broad support for urban revitalization. Incremental 
programs of rehabilitation and social services, these pamphlets argued, could 
not alleviate the structural defects of American cities. The only solution, they 
concluded, was the clearance of blighted areas and the creation of planned 
developments that would revitalize the city. 
With clearance accomplished, Metropolitan Los Angeles envisioned the 
creation of a region of low-density, single-family houses in well-planned 
communities. Each would have a combination of professional, commercial, 
recreational facilities and industry providing employment to area residents. The 
freeway would support the creation of these small communities by "divid[ing] 
the area into cells" that would become the "well-organized communities . . .  of 
the future."122 In Chicago, planners envisioned a central city that, once cleared, 
would be opened up into "superblocks" one-fourth square mile in area. Each 
community within the newly organized city would have a school and park in 
the center, and clusters of high and low-rise apartment buildings would 
surround the central square. Single-family houses would be grouped around 
smaller play areas, and shopping and parking would be close by. 
Neighborhoods would be "linked together by a flowing system of broad 
boulevards and green spaces." Industrial areas, buffered by "green belts," 
would be easily accessible.123 With a master plan "as we build and rebuild, we 
would leave the right places vacant, and what we build would be where it 
belongs," argued Tomorrow's Chicago.124 The modem city would be efficient 
and would enable residents to live more productively. 
Renewal advocates argued that government intervention was necessary to 
make their vision of urban revitalization a reality. Condemnation had to be used 
to secure properties from people who stood in the way of the modem city. 
Eminent domain powers and government subsidy were needed because "most 
blighted properties are valued at far more than their real worth-and at more 
than private enterprise could afford to pay a development agency for them."125 
Government could also lower acquisition costs through eminent domain and 
thereby provide incentives for redevelopment. Responding to criticism that 
such a program would rescue the bad investments of property owners, 
advocates argued that redevelopment would be "a process of strengthening 
municipal fiscal structure and of giving us more orderly and livable 
communities. Incidentally, and as an inescapable by-product of all this, it 
would 'bail out' distressed property." But this would be "a minute part of its 
total effect."126 
122. Scorr, supra note 65, at 95. 
123. HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66, at 140-41. 
124. Jd. at 146. 
125. SCOTT, supra note 65, at 1 10. 
126. Potter, supra note 77, at 178-79. 
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With government assistance, these slum and blighted areas could be 
transformed into new modem communities with amenities that would attract 
middle-income persons. Renewal advocates envisioned the clearance of areas 
large enough to construct neighborhood developments "sufficiently large to 
resemble small towns."127 These newly created areas of the city would have 
lower population densities, more community spaces, and traffic patterns 
organized to support business while protecting residential areas. "In a way, it is 
a plan to bring suburban advantages to the center of the city," argued 
Tomorrow 's Chicago.128 Urban renewal would counter the lure of the suburbs 
and place cities in a more competitive position to attract residents.129 
But none of this would be possible without legal reform. Advocates used 
these pamphlets and other publicly-disseminated documents to justify the 
increasing power of the state in the private market. "[S]ome citizens," the 
author of Metropolitan Los Angeles granted, "hold the opinion that planning for 
a whole metropolitan area is undemocratic--that it smacks of totalitarianism or 
some other form of control from the top down, in contrast to our ideal of action 
from the grass roots upward."130 But planning in the United States, advocates 
argued, was a democratic process, based on the sanctity of individual rights. 
"When there is comprehensive planning and control of land use, private­
property rights are generally made more secure. Landowners have some 
protection against sudden and chaotic change in their own areas and those 
adjoining," concluded Tomorrow's Chicago.131 Public/private cooperation 
would provide the means to ensure that property values were maintained. 
Planning professionals also argued that the completion of a comprehensive 
master plan provided a public benefit that countered concerns about the abuse 
of eminent domain powers. "Nothing is unconstitutional until the courts make it 
so," claimed Alfred Bettrnan, a leading advocate of master plans and urban 
redevelopment. Bettrnan argued that, while some people believed that the urban 
renewal scheme violated the Public Use Clause, there was no reason to believe 
that the courts would not approve a "carefully drawn measure, rational in its 
conceptions, genuine in its details, administered with intelligence and integrity, 
and which meets a real social and economic evil which, by its very nature, 
cannot be reached without public action of this nature . . . . "132 The creation of 
modem neighborhoods would provide an appropriate application of the Public 
Use Clause, he asserted. 
127. HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66, at 72. 
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While most renewal advocates argued that urban renewal was legally 
permissible under then-current interpretations of the doctrine, other advocates 
flatly stated that the primacy of property rights must be superseded and that the 
narrow interpretation of the Public Use Clause was unsuited to modem urban 
problems. "[l]t has become clear beyond question," argued Guy Greer, "that the 
rights of individual property ownership can no longer be considered absolute: 
they must be modified to avoid destruction of the rights of the community at 
large."133 Condenmation would provide owners with the fair value of their 
property and improve urban neighborhoods for all residents. By making the 
elimination of blight vital to the survival of the city, advocates avoided 
questions about who benefited from the condenmation process and who bore 
the costs. Although many city residents objected to the taking of their 
properties, the discourse of blight, emanating from seemingly objective 
professionals, obscured the debate over urban revitalization programs. 
The development of the discourse of blight reflected an evolution in the 
proper uses of eminent domain. Eminent domain in the nineteenth century was 
used primarily to secure undeveloped land. By the late I 800s, condemnation of 
improved land was an important part of city building, used for bridges, utilities, 
transportation, and other types of infrastructure. The use of eminent domain 
was not new to post-war America, but the urban renewal scheme was 
nevertheless novel, both in form and scope. It authorized the transfer of land 
from one group of private owners to another group that would use it for 
practically the same purposes, and it envisioned the transfer of large amounts of 
real estate in an effort to reshape the urban landscape. Urban renewal was a 
major undertaking that required not only vast amounts of funding but also an 
alteration of the relationship between property owners and the state. By 
advocating a reinterpretation of the Public Use Clause and cementing the 
discourse of blight, widely disseminated pamphlets like Metropolitan Los 
Angeles and Tomorrow's Chicago were crucial to the adoption of the program. 
Through their rhetoric, these documents explained the public purpose behind 
these private transfers and helped mute concerns about the expansive powers 
that the program created. 134 
V. PUBLIC RENEWAL AND PRIVATE BENEFIT 
By the 1940s, renewal advocates had created a detailed program for urban 
revitalization. The basic tenets of urban renewal held that in order to protect 
property values and promote the efficient growth of urban areas, cities needed a 
comprehensive plan for redevelopment. The plan would designate the areas to 
133. GREER, supra note 79, at 116. 
134. For a discussion of these efforts to secure public support, see CHARLES W. ELIOT, CITIZEN 
SUPPORT FOR LOS ANGELES DEVELOPMENT ( 1945). 
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be. reclaimed and what types of projects would be built in each district. The 
actual development would be conducted privately, but the government would 
be an important partner. To keep acquisition costs down, eminent domain 
powers, along with government subsidies, were necessary.135 Throughout the 
decade, renewal advocates lobbied the public to support their program. As 
experimental renewal programs began and the discourse of blight turned from 
theory to reality, the limitations of the terminology became clear. Developers 
selected properties not because they were run down, but because they were 
profitably attractive. Moreover, politicians and institutional leaders used 
redevelopment programs to serve other goals like the restriction of mobility for 
blacks. 
During the 1940s, a majority of states passed redevelopment acts. New 
York state was the first to pass urban renewal legislation in 1941, followed by 
Illinois, and by 1948 twenty-five states had similar laws.136 These laws 
authorized the creation of locally-chartered organizations with the authority to 
condemn and clear blighted areas that . would then be privately redeveloped. 
The programs varied in their particulai'S'-some ·acts ·authorized the creation of 
private organizations to condemn . properties, while other8 vested that 
responsibility in a newly created public agency or in the area's public housing 
administration. Some redevelopment acts authorized the use of tax incentives to 
promote revitalization, and one (Illinois) . provided grants to subsidize 
developments. Most demanded the submission of comprehensive plans for the 
desigoated areas, and many required that the plans be approved by the local 
planning comrmsswn. Despite these particular differences among 
redevelopment plans, however, they did share one important requirement: all 
required that, after land was set aside for public infrastructure, the cleared 
property be transferred to private developers. 
Eminent domain powers were the most significant facet of these 
redevelopment acts. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 was 
typical. Passed by Congress after lobbying from several groups, including the 
American Society of Planning Officials and the Urban Land Institute, it 
declared that, "owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay­
out, and other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with 
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas . . .  are injurious to the public 
health, safety, morals, and welfare."137 The legislation further concluded that 
redevelopment could not be attained by "the ordinary operations of private 
135. See Bettman, Federal and State Urban Redevelopment Legislation, supra note 81, at 168. 
136. See JUSTEMENT, supra note 93, at 29-30; SCOTT, supra note 53, at 424-25; see also Bettman, 
Federal and State Urban Redevelopment Bills, supra note 81, at 166 (discussing legislation pending in 
1943); Thomas Desmond, Blighted Areas'Get a New Chance, 30 NAT'L MUN. REv. 629, 629-32 (1941) 
(discussing New York's Desmond-Mitchell Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law). 
137. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 2, 60 Stat. 790 (1946) (current 
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enterprise" and made the legislative determination that "the acquisition and the 
assembly of real property and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment" 
was a "public use."138 Other state acts also emphasized the importance of 
eminent domain and included specific provisions to convince the courts that 
their programs were constitutional. When New York amended its act in 1 942 to 
allow insurance companies to invest in housing projects, it declared that the 
condenmation of blighted areas for the development of housing was a "superior 
public use," giving urban renewal projects priority even when local 
governments considered using sites to build schools, parks, or other public 
works.139 
Despite much legislative activity, only two major renewal projects 
commenced in the early 1940s-Pittsburgh's redevelopment of the Golden 
Triangle, which eliminated an industrial district in the oldest section of the city 
and replaced it with office buildings, and Metropolitan Life Insurance's 
Stuyvesant Town, which cleared the east side of Manhattan between 14th and 
23"' streets for residential construction. The Stuyvesant project required the 
uprooting of 1 1,000 working-class families so that they could be replaced by 
8,756 middle-class families. Stuyvesant Town was a harbinger of problems to 
come as urban renewal expanded its scope. Lewis Mumford called the project 
"prefabricated blight" and condenmed its high density and lack of public 
amenities (including its lack of schools).140 Others complained that the project, 
with rents too high for the working-class residents dislocated by the clearance 
of the area, added to New York's wartime housing shortage. African­
Americans bridled at the comments of Metropolitan Life Insurance Chainnan 
Frederick Ecker, who defended the company's decision to deny admission to 
blacks by declaring that "blacks and whites just don't mix."141 But most of New 
York's political, business, and civic leadership supported the project 
wholeheartedly, and most housing reformers, though they expressed concern 
over the dislocation of the poor, also welcomed the development. Desperate to 
clear blighted areas, these elites argued that tough choices had to be made.142 
The majority of people uprooted for Stuyvesant Town were white, but soon 
urban renewal would set its sights on the black ghetto. While race was always 
central to definitions of blight, after the great migrations of World War II, race 
played an increasingly important role in city planning. By the mid-1 940s, the 
expanding minority black and Latino ghettos were the main concern of 
business leaders and urban politicians. In 1 950, for example, the Los Angeles 
138. !d. 
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City Plahning Commission desigoated eleven areas as blighted. All but one of 
them had a population that was majority Mexican-American or African­
American.143 Chicago, according to city planners, had the largest blighted 
central areas of any city in the United States, over twenty square miles. The 
area selected almost completely overlay Chicago's "black belt" on the 
Southside and included many rapidly changing areas on the Westside.144 
Because of its increasing concern over the expansion of the black ghetto, 
Chicago became a leader in the slum clearance movement. While white 
neighborhoods to the south of the ghetto responded violently to the arrival of 
black neighbors, Chicago's elites were more subtle in their reactions to 
neighborhood change. After World War II, business leaders from downtown 
department stores and ftnancial institutions joined with major nonprofit 
organizations, including the University of Chicago and the Illinois Institute of 
Technology (liT), to respond to the encroachment of the ghetto. These elites 
were concerned that their investments were imperiled by the growth of black 
Chicago, and they sought to renew the areas surrounding downtown to make 
them attractive to middle-income people. "We have two choices, either to run 
away from the blight or to stand and ftght,�' argoed Henry Heald, liT's 
president.145 Rallying behind the slogan "Stand and Fight" and led by Heald, 
realtor Fred Kramer, and businessman Holman Pettibone, business and 
institotional leaders embarked on the revitalization of the inner city.146 
In 194 7, pushed by this coalition, Chicago Mayor Martin Kennelly reached 
an agreement with New York Life Insurance Company to build the "Lake 
Meadows" development on the near Southside. While much of the proposed 
clearance area was deteriorated, New York Life created a controversy when it 
demanded that several well-maintained blocks be cleared because they would 
afford the project better views of the lake. Even redevelopment advocates 
acknowledged that the plan igoored "actoal slum areas completely" and 
planned ''the demolition of a well-kept Negro area where the bulk of property is 
resident owned, its taxes paid, and its maintenance above par."147 Residents 
argued that the area was not a slum and that they were "being wrongfully 
ousted from the land where they have invested thousands of dollars in upkeep 
and improvements."148 Protesters further asserted that the project was '"Negro 
clearance' rather than slum clearance" and said, "If it is a slum clearance 
143. ALEXANDER& BRYANT, supra note 1 16, at 38. 
144. See HILLMAN & CASEY, supra note 66, at 70; CHI. PLAN COMM'N, HOUSING GOALS FOR 
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\ 149 program, then let's make it that and start where the slums are." Although 
their complaints delayed the project, these efforts ultimately did not stop the 
clearance of the area. 
The Lake Meadows development was a success in providing middle-class 
housing to Chicagoans (unlike most renewal projects the new tenants were also 
black), and the clearance of the area also enabled local institutions like liT to 
expand their facilities. At the same time, the project replaced only a small 
percentage of the units that were demolished and exacerbated the severe 
housing shortage in the city. Excluded from many areas, poor blacks 
increasingly relied on the units of the Chicago Housing Authority for shelter. 
As a result, the hopes of housing officials to maintain integration in Chicago's 
public projects were dashed. In addition, the dislocation caused by the Lake 
Meadows project increased pressure on other neighborhoods, heightened 
tensions between blacks and whites, and accelerated neighborhood decline in 
other areas of the Southside.150 
Lake Meadows, Stuyvesant Town, and Pittsburgh's Golden Triangle 
received national attention as models for urban redevelopment, but they were 
the only achievements that renewal advocates could claim during the 1940s. 
Despite the acceptance of the need for redevelopment and the passage of state 
laws to support such efforts, major obstacles to renewal remained. The 
condemnation process was cumbersome and many property owners fought their 
ejection. Because urban renewal laws were untested in most states, struggles 
over condemnation went all the way to state supreme courts. In addition, 
renewal area residents, who were typically poor and politically weak, still 
elicited support in their efforts to save their neighborhoods. Furthermore, the 
tax credits authorized by most state acts were not enough to excite the interest 
of private developers. Even though renewal advocates believed slum properties 
could be put to a "higher use," planning principles (which required lower 
density development) would result in lower returns in renewal areas. I5l 
Therefore, advocates argued, redevelopment required government 
fmancing. "Private enterprise will not be able to redevelop property on the 
basis of the present cost of acquisition unless the excessive valuations are 
written off by means of either tax exemptions or direct subsidies," argued 
developer Louis Justement, whose views were seconded by the National 
Association of Housing Officials and the NAREB.152 But cities and states 
lacked the resources for a significant renewal program, and as renewal efforts 
149. Housing Project Hangs Fire: Charges 'Clearance' of Negroes is Aim, Cm. DEFENDER, May 
7, 1949, at 4. 
150. See HIRsCH, supra note 12, at 122-23. 
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152. JUSTEMENT, supra note 93, at 54. 
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stalled, advocates increased their focus on the federal government. National 
subsidies, they argued, were necessary to revitalize cities. "It is no more than 
equitable that the credit of the federal government be applied to the reclamation 
of eroded urban land," argued ULI President Hugh Potter.153 "The cities need 
not Jeel like paupers going hat-.in-hand to· a source of bounty in seeking the use 
of such credit for they contain in large measure the sources from which it is 
drawn."154 Throughout the 1940s, the NAREB and other lobby groups used 
such arguments in advocating for the passage of federal legislation to support 
urban redevelopment.155 
Several senators agreed. In 1945, Senators Robert Taft, Allen Ellender, and 
Robert Wagner introduced a comprehensive housing act. Their proposal 
combined funding for additional p11blic housing with subsidies to lower the 
costs of acquisition in slum clearance sites. Under Title I of the bill, the federal 
government would pay two-thirds of the cost of purchasing and clearing 
renewal areas. While many groups supported the bill; it languished for four 
years because' of NAREB opposition. Real estate interests certainly wanted 
government aid for renewal efforts, but they were so adamantly opposed to the 
public housing included in the legislation that they would not support the bill. 
After his election in 1949, President Truman made urban housing a centerpiece 
of his "Fair. Deal," and the bill finally passed. . The Housing Act of 1 949 
promoted the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through 
the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible 
of the goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every 
American family" through public and private construction.156 
The bill was a high point of post-war liberalism, representing the largest 
commitment in. American history to aid the unfortunate through publicly­
subsidized housing. But it was vague aboui how this goal was to be met. The 
810,000 units of public housing authorized in the legislation fell far short of the 
demand, and Congress failed to fund even that low target. By linking urban 
renewal to the program, the Housing Act of 1949 ultimately displaced many 
thousands more families than it housed, and tbe bill had only weak protections 
for the people dislocated by renewal efforts. These flaws would become evident 
as the program was implemented, but at the time, the Act was hailed by 
housing reformers and city planners as a means to restore cities to their central 
153. Potter, supra note 77, at 177. 
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place in American life.157 
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF URBAN RENEWAL 
Mid-century saw urban renewal projects planned or underway in c1lies 
across the nation. New York remained the leader in urban renewal, with several 
major developments in progress. In the post-war years, the combination of 
public housing, highway, and urban renewal projects undertaken by the city's 
redevelopment czar Robert Moses changed the face of whole neighborhoods. 
Though the uprooting of residents in clearance areas had been a concern before, 
the extent of New York's program made relocation a major problem. The City 
Planning Commission estimated that, between 1 946 and 1953, more than 
250,000 people were uprooted in the city. Hundreds of aparlinent buildings, 
stores, factories, and warehouses were condemned in pursuit of New York's 
modernization. 158 
Despite the dislocation of thousands across the country, urban renewal was 
accepted as a necessity by 1950. Commenting on redevelopment plans in the 
southwest section of Washington, D.C., the Post portrayed the issue as one of 
"Progress or Decay" and stated bluntly that "Washington Must Choose."159 
Only redevelopment, the paper argued, could stop the "headlong flight to the 
suburbs."160 The New York Times, assessing the nation's largest urban renewal 
program, stated that change was inevitable and celebrated the efforts of the 
"municipal surgeons" who performed "a series of operations" to revive the 
city.161 Despite the serious impact it had on many residents, urban renewal was 
widely viewed as the only answer to the decline of the city. 
Faced with a clear crisis in cities, only a few policy-makers expressed 
concerns about the possible abuse of eminent domain powers. New York 
housing reformer Charles Abrams was one. "In my opinion, under present 
redevelopment Jaws, Macy's conld condemn Gimbels-if Robert Moses gave 
the word," Abrams argued.'62 Bnt even Abrams believed that condemnation 
was necessary-his complaint was that the power was wielded 
undemocratically. Civil rights activists also struggled to balance competing 
concerns in the debate over urban renewal. In his 1 948 book The Negro Ghetto, 
157. See GELFAND, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 54-55; HALPERN, supra note 74, at 65; MOLLENKOPF, supra 
note I 0, at 79-80; SCOTT, supra note 53, at 460-67; TEAFORD, supra note II, at 107. 
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Robert Weaver (later to become the first HUD Secretary) argued that urban 
renewal presented a ''threat or an opportunity" to African-Americans.163 He 
worried that the program would be used to· entrench racial segregation and 
prevent blacks from moving into new areas. While Weaver's fears were borne 
out in the early 1950s, he continued to support the principle of urbanrenewal, 
and he argued that areas developed according to ''sound planning principles" 
provided tlie best hope for the integration of middle-class blacks into society. 
Weaver's complaints were not with the use of eminent domain, but with the 
focus of redevelopment officials on the clearance of minority areas and their 
refusal to support integration in newly developed areas.164 
Faced with increasing momentom in the urban. redevelopment movement, 
property owners and clearance area residents did not meekly accept the renewal 
program. Instead, in every city that attempted condenination, the courts were 
forced to adjudicate disputes over the implementation of the program. Recent 
precedents facing litigants clearly favored an expansive definition of a public 
use.165 But many of the cases had been about public housing, which benefited 
only a small number of people but, nevertheless, was a government-oWned 
undertaking. This changed in the late 1940s and early 1 950s, when at least 
sevente�n state courts considered . the constitotionality of redevelopment 
statutes.166 All but three of these courts upheld the right of local authorities to 
condemn land and turn it over to private parties for renewal. The success of 
renewal initiatives in state courts depended on a coordinated effort of real estate 
interests and housing reformers. The NAREB, the National Association of 
Housing Officials, the National Conference of Mayors, and other pro­
redevelopment groups provided assistance to state and local authorities, helped 
to draft briefs, and submitted their own amicus curiae briefs to the courts. 
Courts relied heavily on these briefs in writing their opinions, and many of 
them directly appropriated the language ofblight.167 
Most states had declared slum clearance · a public use in public housing 
cases a decade earlier, so much of the litigation over urban renewal acts 
centered on two questions: Was the condemnation of blighted properties legal 
in areas that were not yet slums, and was the transfer of condemned property to 
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private parties allowed under the Public Use Clause? Renewal advocates 
argued that clearance of slums and blighted areas was imperative and that a 
comprehensive program was necessary to prevent further urban decline.16" The 
courts agreed. Following the lead of renewal advocates, judicial opinions 
frequently merged slums and blight into one phenomenon, ignoring the 
argument that urban renewal was more about private redevelopment than about 
slum clearance. To many courts, urban problems were so severe that it was 
inappropriate for judges to restrict the use of condemnation to solve them. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that if urban renewal was rejected, cities 
would "continue to be marred by areas which are focal centers of disease, 
constitute pernicious environments for the young, and, while contributing little 
to the tax income of the municipality, consume an excessive proportion of its 
revenues because of the extra services required for police, fire, and other forms 
of protection."169 The future of the city, the court concluded, rested on the 
ability of government to eliminate slums and blight. Slum clearance, the court 
reasoned, "certainly falls within any conception of 'public use' for nothing can 
be more beneficial to the community as a whole than the clearance of [areas] 
characterized by the evils described in the Urban Redevelopment Law."170 
Considering the argument that the transfer of property to private parties 
violated the Public Use Clause, courts recapitulated the argument of renewal 
advocates that removal of blight was the object of redevelopment acts and that 
the subsequent disposition of the property did not vitiate the public benefits 
provided by clearance. That private property cannot be taken for private use "is 
too well settled to require citation of authority," the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court stated. "But the plaintiffs argument, we think puts the cart before the 
horse."171 The purpose of the act was to clear slums, and any ancillary impacts 
were not significant. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed. Redevelopment 
acts were "directed solely to the clearance, reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
the blighted area, and after that is accomplished the public purpose is 
completely realized," the court reasoned.172 Even though private developers 
were central to the program, the court concluded that it was "not the object of 
the state to transfer property from one individual to another; such transfers, so 
far as they may actually occur, are purely incidental to the accomplishment of 
168. For a representative argument by a redevelopment authority, see Appellee's Brief, Belovsky v. 
Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947), in SUPREME COURT PAPER BOOKS (Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, 1948). 
169. Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277, 282 (Pa. 1947). 
170. Jd. 
171. Papadinis v. City of Somerville, 121 N.E.2d 714, 717 (Mass. 1954) ("[W]e are of the opinion 
that the main purpose of the plan is slum clearance and that the disposition of the land by sale thereafter 
is incidental to that purpose. Once the public purpose contemplated by the statute has been achieved the 
authority is not obliged to retain the cleared land as unproductive property."). 
172. Belovsky, 54 A.2d at 282. 
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the re!ll or fundamental purpose."173 The Illinois Supreme Court similarly held 
that 
when rehabilitation . has been accomplished .by. the acquisition of the land and the 
removal of the structures, and after holding and using it for some appropria� public 
pwpose, if there is any surplus land left, which is not needed for any of these 
puiposes, it may be sold, leased Or exchangl:d ·as prOvided therein.174 
By conflating the two stepS'-4!lum clearance and rc;development'---{:ourts made 
the dramatic expansion of eminent domain powers appear unexceptional: 
Not all state courts agreed tl:tat urban renewal was an appropriate 
governmental function. The Supreme Court of Florida declared that the 
condemnation of private homes for private commercial redevelopment was 
unconstitutional and concluded that "if the municipalities can be vested with 
any such power or authority, they can take over the entire field of enterprise 
without limit so long as they can find a blighted area containing sufficient real 
estate."175 The Georgia Supreme Court shared this view and rejected the 
attempt of the Housing Authority of Atlanta to condemn industrial and 
residential property in order to create a modern industrial park. Acknowledging 
that other state · courts had held differently, · tlie court stated that it could not 
"subscribe to the doctrine that the power of eminent domain may be resorted 
to . . .  every time tl:tete may be some public benefit resulting. To hold so would 
be to cut the very foundation from under the sacred rightto own property."176 
South Carolina's Supreme Court also invalidated that state's urban renewal 
act, 177 but these were the only objections. By 1954, a large body of state law 
had approved the urban renewal scheme. 
Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit's opposition to public housing and urban 
renewal programs, federal precedents also favored renewal advocates. The 
Supreme Court had long given wide latitude to the use of eminent domain, and 
during the 1930s, the judicial underpinnings of the public use doctrine began to 
collapse. Although tl:te 1934 case of Nebbia v. New York178 was not about the 
Public Use Clause, it did set the ton� for dramatic changes in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence with respect to judicial review of economic regulation, thus 
laying the foundation for the Berman decision. In considering New York 
State's attempt to regulate the price of milk, Justice Roberts declared that the 
Court's role in assessing legislative regulation of the economy was very 
173. Id at 283. 
174. People ex rei. Tuohy v. City of Chicago; 68 N.E.2d 761, 766 (111. 1946); see also David 
Jeffrey Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 66 N.W.2d 362, 375 (Wis. 1954) (''The fact that the property may not 
long remain in the ownership of the city does not in itself indicate that the use will not be a public use 
and that the city may not be invested with the power of eminent domain in acquiring it."). 
175. Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663, 668-69 (Fla. 1952). 
176. Housing Auth: v. Johnson, 74 S.E.2d 891, 894 (Ga. 1953). This opinion: was reversed by 
amendment to the Georgia State Constitution in 1954. S� Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 456; Note, supra 
note 166, at 1425. 
177. Edens v. City of Columbia, 91 S.E.2d 280 (S.C. 1956). 
178. 291 u.s. 502 (1934). 
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limited. Prior to Nebbia, the Court required that businesses be "affected with 
the public interest" to be subject to regulation. Roberts, however, declared that 
the states were "free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be 
deemed to promote the public welfare."179 Nebbia had no direct impact on 
Public Use Clause jurisprudence, but, by questioning the necessity for a judicial 
investigation into the nature of govermnent regulation, the case undermined the 
meaning of the Public Use Clause. If all legislative enactments were presumed 
to serve the public interest, then the Fifth Amendment limitations on the power 
of eminent domain were empty. 
In cases involving eminent domain, the Supreme Court continued to grant 
wide deference to the legislature. In 1 946, the Court allowed the Tennessee 
Valley Authority to condemn property for an electric power project. The land 
owners argued that the property was not necessary for the completion of the 
power darn, but the Court stated that "it is the function of Congress to decide 
what type of taking is for a public use and the agency authorized to do the 
taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority."180 In the aftermath 
of that decision, the Court's deference to the legislature caused at least one 
legal commentator to write a "requiem" for the public use doctrine, but this 
scholar may have missed its passing by a decade.181 
It was in this context of expanding state approval for urban renewal and 
broadened federal authority for eminent domain in other contexts that the 
federal courts considered the issue of urban renewal. In 1 952, the District of 
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (DCRLA) proposed a massive 
clearance project that would lead to the reconstruction of almost the entire 
southwest quadrant of the city. During its twenty-year duration, this project 
dislocated over 20,000 impoverished black residents and replaced their homes 
with office buildings, stores, and predominantly middle-income housing. As 
part of this initiative, the DCRLA condemned a department store owned by 
Max Morris. All the parties agreed that his property was not "blighted," but the 
agency argued that the parcel was necessary to "replan" the area.182 
When Morris filed for an injunction against the taking, Judge E. Barrett 
Prettyman, in a long and complex opinion for the three-judge panel that heard 
the case, held that the District of Columbia's redevelopment law was 
constitutional. The condemnation of property to eliminate or prevent slums, 
which were "injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare," was a 
valid purpose under the Constitution, the court ruled, and the agency could take 
179. !d. at 537. For an assessment of the importance of this case, see CUSHMAN, supra note 29, at 
80-81. 
180. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551�52 (1946). 
181. Note, The Public Use Doctrine: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949). 
182. See Schneider v. D.C. Redev. Land Agency, 117  F. Supp. 705 (D.C. 1953); Brief for the 
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency and National Capital Planning Commission at 13-14, 
Bennan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53); LOWE, supra note 142, at 205. 
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land in such circumstances ,even if it was to be transferred to private parties, 183 
But the court sought to place limitations on the DCRLA' s right to condemn: 
"These extensions of the concept of eminent domain . . .  are potentially 
dangerous to basic principles of our system of government. And it behooves the 
courts to be alert lest currently at\factive projects impinge upon fundamental 
rights."184 Prettyman concluded that the government cannot seize property 
merely because it is in a slum. The condemnation was authorized. only "to the 
extent that the taking is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the 
asserted public purpose."185 Interpreting the Redevelopment Act in this manner, 
the court upheld the law. 
The taking of "blighted" land, however, presented greater difficulties for 
the court. Judge Prettyman took issue with the DCRLA's definition. of blight 
and declared .that the condemnation of land for aesthetic purposes was not 
valid. Prettyman's opinion critiqued the basic philosophy of modern planning. 
Some people, he argued, "prefer single-family dwellings, .like small flower 
gardens, believe that a plot of ground is the place to rear children, prefer fresh 
to conditioned air, sun to fluorescent light."186 However, "in many circles," the 
opinion continued, "such views are considered 'backward and stagnant "'187 He 
questioned: "Is a modern apartment a better breeder of men than is the detliched 
or rowhouse? Is the local corner grocer a less desirable community asset than 
the absentee stockholder in the national chain . . .  ?"188 It was not the 
government's prerogative, Prettyman declared, to determine who was correct in 
such matters. "The slow, the old, the small in ambition, the devotee of the 
outmoded have no less right to property than have the quick, the young, the 
aggressive, and the modernistic or.futnristic."189 
The DCRLA's view of its authority, the court concluded, was overly broad. 
The agency argued that it had the right to select any area for clearance as long 
as a slum existed within its boundaries. Since the statote did not define blight or 
explain what would constitute an appropriate land usage and allowed the 
DCRLA to determine such factors on a case-by-case basis, Prettyman 
concluded that the authority granted by the act would amount to an 
"unreviewable power to seize and sell whole sections of the city."190 In so 
concluding, the opinion critiqued the expansion of government power into 
private life envisioned by the Redevelopment Act. The purpose of the 
DCRLA's plan in Southwest Washington, the court argued, was "to create a 
183. Schneider, l l7 F. Supp. at 718-19. 
184. Id. at 716. 
185. Id. at 718-19. 
186. Id. 
187. ld. 
188. Id. 
189. ld. 
190. Id. at 721. 
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pleasant neighborhood," and if such a scheme were ''undertaken by private 
persons the project would be most laudable. "191 However, "as yet the courts 
have not come to call such pleasant accomplishments a public purpose." 192 To 
do so would run "squarely into the right of the individual to own property and 
to use it as he pleases."193 The rights of private property are subject only to 
necessary government intervention. "One man's land cannot be seized by the 
government and sold to another man merely in order that the purchaser may 
build upon it a better house . . . .  "194 
Because the court held the law constitutional but placed numerous 
restrictions on the DCRLA's condemnation powers, both parties appealed, 
asking the Supreme Court to define the limits of the Public Use Clause. The 
DCRLA desired the broadest possible interpretation of the clause, while the 
appellants argued that linlimited authority would imperil the basic rights of 
property owners. In its briefs to the Supreme Court, the DCRLA asserted that 
the condemnation of Morris's property was necessary to prevent the further 
decline of Southwest Washington. That purpose, the agency argued, was well 
within the police power of Congress, which authorized the agency to ''promote 
the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the District of Columbia by 
eliminating and preventing slums and to use eminent domain for that 
purpose."195 The agency further asserted that prior attempts at urban renewal 
had failed to revitalize cities and a comprehensive program was necessary. 
"Because it was not satisfied with earlier efforts to solve the problem of . . .  
blighted areas . . .  Congress discarded the piecemeal or individual structure 
approach and sought to attain its goal by replanning and redevelopment [of] the 
whole of substandard areas. "196 Relying on several state cases, the agency 
further argued that the clearance was the ''public purpose" and the subsequent 
sale was ''purely incident to the basic program."197 In the alternative, the 
DCRLA argued that the public purpose continued even after the property was 
no longer publicly owned because the property would be subject to strict 
regulations after its sale.198 
Morris's attorneys argued that the taking violated the Fifth Amendment. 
They claimed that the program was not one of slum clearance but simply a real 
. 
th " d fr 
. . 
th 199 estate promotiOn at trans1erre property om one pnvate entity to ano er. 
191. !d. at 724. 
192. !d. 
193. !d. 
194. Id. 
195. Brief for the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency and National Capital Planning 
Commission at 19, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53). 
196. Id at 32. 
197. !d. at 29. 
198. !d. at 30 (citing Ve1ishka v. City of Nashua, 106 A.2d 574 (N.H. 1954)). 
199. Brief for Appellant Bennan at 10, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53). 
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The agency, their brief insisted, believed that "diverse ownership and lease­
hold interests are not conducive to a sound business center and that single 
ownership of the commercial area would enhance the character."200 While they 
conceded this argument might be true, they maintained that "such pleasant 
accomplishments cannot be called a public use or purpose which would 
validate seizure."201 The appellants also argued that the law was void because 
the renewal legislation had no "standard for the factual determination of a 
blighted area.'.2°2 In fact, despite three pages of terms relevant to the 
legislation, the District's Urban Renewal Act had no definition of blight. In 
response, the redevelopment advocates argued that the standards were 
delineated by the terms themselves. "Adequate and specific standards," argued 
the DCRLA, "are set out in the following language: 'technological and 
sociological changes,' 'obsolete lay-out,' 'substandard and blighted areas,' . . .  
'comprehensive planning and replanning,' 'lack of sanitary facilities, 
ventilation or light,' 'delapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior 
arrangements. "'203 
Although the parties debated in detail the technical definition of blight and 
the legal rationale for urban renewal efforts, none of the briefs in the Berman 
case even mentioned the fact that the project would uproot thousands of poor 
blacks and would reshape Washington's racial landscape. The fact that both 
parties ignored this aspect of the case is particularly poignant because Berman 
was argued just four months after the Supreme Court's monumental declaration 
on American race relations in Brown v. Board of Education.204 Brown began an 
era in which the Court rewrote much of the constitutional jurisprudence 
regarding individual rights. Berman was a minor case in the context of these 
major changes to American law, and it therefore receives little attention in 
analyses of the Warren Court.205 But the two cases were intimately related. The 
urban renewal program that the Court approved allowed cities to redistribute 
their populations, increasing residential segregation and thereby making the 
integration of schools far more difficult. 
Justice William 0. Douglas did make note of the racial makeup of the 
population in the renewal district, but he did not attach any significance to that 
fact. After noting that the renewal area was seriously deteriorated (64.3% of the 
dwellings were beyond repair, 57.8% had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 
200. !d. 
201. !d. 
202. !d. at 13. 
203. Brief for Renah F. Camalier and Louis W. Prentiss, Commissioners of the District of 
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency at 9, Bennan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (No. 476-53). 
204. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown was decided in May of 1954 while Berman was argued in 
September. 
205. Lucas Powe, for example, does not cite the case in his political history of the Warren Court. 
See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THEW ARREN COURT AND AMERlCAN POLITICS (2000). 
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and 83.8% lacked central heating) as well as 97.5% "Negroes," the Court 
unanimously approved the condemnation and granted redevelopment 
authorities broad discretion for urban renewat2°6 The authority bestowed by the 
police power of Congress as administrator of the District, Douglas asserted, "is 
essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes 
of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete 
definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature 
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive. "207 
Public safety and health are well within the police power, Douglas stated, 
and the urban renewal program songht to improve them. Directly appropriating 
the language of planners, he argued that 
miserable and disreputable housing conditions do more than spread disease and 
crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people 
who live there to the status of cattle . . . .  They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on 
the community which robs it of charm . . . .  The misery of housing may despoil a . . . 208 communtty as an open sewer may rum a nver. 
Douglas upbraided the lower court for substituting its policy preferences for 
those of the legislature and declared that Congress · has the authority to 
"determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious 
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."209 If 
democratically elected officials decide that such improvements are worthy, 
Douglas stated, there is "nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the 
way."21o 
Slums and blighted areas were a threat to the health of cities, and both were 
within the purview of urban renewal. "The experts," Douglas stated, 
concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it were not to revert again to 
a blighted or slum area, as though possessed of a congenital disease, the area must 
be planned as a whole . . . . to eliminate the conditions that cause slums-the 
overcrowding of dwellings, the lack o�1yarks . . .  the lack of light and air, the presence of outmoded street patterns . . . .  
Douglas agreed that the commission had the authority to include a large area in 
the renewal district so as to avoid the "piecemeal approach." The "public 
purpose" having been decided, the means of executing the project were "for the 
Congress and Congress alone to determine."212 Therefore, the Court concluded, 
it was within Congress' authority to decide that the "public end may be as well 
206. Berman, 348 U.S. at 30, 36. 
207. !d. at 32. 
208. ld at 32-33. 
209. Id. at 33. 
210. ld. 
211. ld at 34. 
212. ld. at 33. 
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or better served through an agency of private enterprise . . .  .'"'13 
Douglas also rejected the argument that the standards for determining the 
redevelopment area were inadequate for it was, he argued, "the need of the area 
as a whole. which Congress" addressed .and the goal of eliminating "not only 
slums" but "also the blighted areas that tend to produce slums" was an 
acceptable delegation of authority}14 In· conclusion, the Court declared, the 
rights of property owners were '.'satisfied when they receive that just 
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking. "215 
That Douglas would take such a strong position in support of the urban 
renewal program is unremarkable. Douglas and the rest of the Court viewed 
urban renewal as a government initiative to improve the econontic and social 
conditions of cities. By the time Berman was argued, the Court had a more than 
twenty-year record of restraint in considering such measures.216 Berman was 
consistent with the New Deal Court's philosophy that legislatores were best 
suited to determine the appropriate uses of government power in the area of 
econontic regulation. The DCRLA and other redevelopment agencies, run by 
planning experts, would apply professional standards to determine which areas 
required redevelopment and would implement the program in an equitable 
fashion for the benefit of the city. 
The irony is that, at the same time it was deciding Berman, the Court was 
deciding Brown, which reflects a distrust of government (particularly local 
government) to protect the interests of minority groups and to treat all citizens 
equally. Douglas's opinion in Berman reflects a faith in the political system's 
ability to operate in a non-discriminatory manner.217 Urban renewal, however, 
was an economic development program with profound racial implications that 
were iguored by all the parties to the litigation. The reality of urban renewal 
was that redevelopment was. used to reshape the racial and economic geography 
of cities. Such was the case in Southwest Washington where, of the 5,900 units 
of housing that were constructed on the site, only 3 1 0  could be classified as 
213. Id. at33-34. 
214. Id. at 35. 
215. /d at36. 
216. In United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1937), the Court stated that it would 
grant legislatures wide latitude in reviewing economic regulation. Justice Stone stated that "regulatory 
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless 
. . .  it is of such character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators." 304 U.S. at 152. Douglas's approach to the urban renewal 
program is consistent with Carolene Products. On the Court's jurisprudence regarding economic 
regulation, see CUSHMAN, supra note 29; GILLMAN, supra note 29, at 200-05; and Martin Shapiro, The 
Supreme Court's "Return" to Economic Regulation, in 1 STIJDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 91 (Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek eds., 1986). 
217. This is not to argue that the Court has not considered the discriminatory iinpact of regulatory 
programs. The Court has maintained its authority to review administrative determinations for fairness. 
See Shapiro, supra note 216, at 138-39. The Court's increasing attention to administrative law in the 
past half century is evidence of this effort. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND PROCESS ch. 7 (3d ed. 1999). 
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affordable to the former residents of the area.218 By the 1960s, the formerly 
black neighborhood was majority white. 219 
The rhetoric of blight enabled urban elites to craft and implement these 
broad powers of condemnation. In the decade following Berman, urban renewal 
programs uprooted hundreds of thousands of people, disrupted fragile urban 
neighborhoods, and helped entrench racial segregation in the inner city. Racial 
motivations were often submerged under the labels of "slum clearance" or 
"neighborhood revitalization," but a primary goal of postwar urban renewal 
was to channel minority settlement into certain areas and to uproot minority 
communities in other areas. In cities across the country, urban renewal came to 
be known as "Negro removal." 220 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Berman affected a dramatic expansion in 
the government's powers of eminent domain and provided judicial legitimation 
for urban renewal efforts. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, American 
cities undertook massive redevelopment projects that cleared large areas 
surrounding the central business disttict. These projects resulted in the 
dislocation of more than one million people.Z21 The majority of these families 
were minorities. Across the nation, inner city neighborhoods were designated 
as blighted, properties condemned, and land turned over to private parties. 
Berman, however, was a pyrrhic victory for renewal advocates because the 
urban renewal program carne under attack only a few years after the ruling. By 
the early 1960s, critics were questioning the basic philosophy of urban renewal. 
They argued that, despite the investment of billions of dollars, cities had not 
been revitalized, and they complained that the dislocation caused by the 
program had resulted in the creation of more slums. The movement against 
urban renewal was led by Jane Jacobs, whose best-selling critique of urban 
redevelopment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, argued that the 
diversity of cities was central to their survival. Jacobs assailed principles of 
modem planning and argued that most redevelopment projects did "not rest 
218. See GILLETIE, supra note 159, at 163-64. 
219. See id at 164. For a discussion of the Bennan opinion as part of Douglas's jurisprudence, see 
VERN COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL REcORD OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 376-77 (1974). On 
Douglas's views on civil rights, see Drew S. Days Ill, Justice William 0. Douglas and Civil Rights, in 
"HE SHALL NOT PASS TmS WAY AGAIN'': THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DoUGLAS 109-19 
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990). 
220. See HALPERN, supra note 74, at 68-69; DoUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 56 (1993). 
221. No report has documented the exact number of people dislocated from urban renewal, but a 
1969 report by the National Commission on Urban Problems estimated that the highway program 
uprooted 32,400 families a year during the early 1960s. Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction: The 
Interstates and Central City Housing, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES 227 (John Bauman 
et a!. eds., 2000). 
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soundly on reasoned investment of public tax subsidies, as urban renewal 
theory proclaims, but on vast involuntary subsidies wrought out of helpless site 
victims-. "222 
By the mid-1960s, critics from across the political spectrum declared the 
urban renewal program a prime example of govermnent overreaching. Liberals 
argued that it exacerbated racial discrimination,223 while conservatives stated 
that it wasted government resources and interfered with the private market 224 
The rise of the historic preservation movement also. put a harsh light on large­
scale demolition projects that destroyed important landmarks like New York's 
Pennsylvania Station. As a result of these critiques, the federal urban renewal 
program was greatly curtailed, and urban planners became increasingly 
circumspect about their ability to create a wholly modem city.225 Tbe dream of 
erasing the antiquated city and building a completely modern replacement is no 
longer the planning profession's primary focus. 226 
Condemnation, however, remains a powerful tool of govermnent policy. In 
recent decades, state and local govermnents have undertaken a wide variety of 
initiatives that transferred condemned property to private entities in the name of 
housing, commercial, or industrial development, and th.e urban redevelopment 
corporations created in the 1940s contioue to wield great power over city land 
use. In light of past failures, private ioterests and government bodies are more 
circumspect in promotiog the benefits of eminent domain. Instead. of promising 
to rebuild cities, they focus on more practical aspects such as job creation. The 
reason for usiog the power of condemnation--the desire to secure coveted 
property without private market negotiations-however, remains the same.Z27 
The most famous eminent domain case of the last two decades involved the 
construction of a General Motors plant in Detroit. The project, in the city's 
racially-diverse, workiog-class neighborhood of Poletown (which all parties 
agreed was not blighted), required the acquisition and clearance of a site that 
had over I ,000 buildiogs housing more than 4,200 people. In contestiog the use 
of eminent domain, neighborhood residents faced not only General Motors but 
the city's African-American mayor and all of the area's major labor 
222. JANE JACOBS, T'HEDEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CmES 5 (1993). 
223. See GREER, supra note 10; URBAN RENEWAL: THE REcORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra 
note 1 1 .  
224. See MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN 
RENEWAL, l949-1962 (1964). 
225� Criticisms of urban renewal led to many refonns of the condenmation process to protect the 
interests of property owners and tenants. On changes- in the urban renewal program and the planning 
profession, see THOMAS, supra note 12, at 179-84. The urban renewal program was terminated by the 
Housing and Conununity Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1994). 
226. See THOMAS, supra note 12, at 180-81. 
227. William Nelson, in his analysis of Condenmation in New York City, argues that it has been a 
particularly effective means to subsidize private development projects that receives little public 
attention. See NELSON, supra note 48, at 260-61. On debates over urban development, see BERNARD J. 
FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGAL YN DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES (1989). 
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organizations and non-profit institutions. Both government and labor leaders 
desperately wanted the project, which they hoped would stem the flood of job 
loss in the city. To keep General Motors from building elsewhere, the city spent 
over $200 million to acquire and prepare the property, which it sold to the 
company for $8 million. 228 
The residents' fight against condemnation went all the way to the Supreme 
Court of Michigan, which approved the redevelopment plan.229 Relying on 
Berman, the court declared that it would not restrict the ability of state and 
local government to respond to the economic problems facing the city. If the 
legislature concluded that government support for this kind of economic growth 
was important, the public use requirement was met. 230 "The power of eminent 
domain is to be used in this instance primarily to accomplish the essential 
public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic 
base of the community. The benefit to a private interest is merely incidental," 
the court ruled?31 Other courts have granted similar deference to governmental 
programs that involve the transfer of land to private developers.232 
The concept of blight remains integral to redevelopment efforts. While 
many courts have expanded the Public Use Clause to encompass any initiative 
that brings economic growth, most states still require that a redevelopment 
agency determine that an area is blighted before condemnation can occur.233 
Legislatures have created long lists of criteria that redevelopment agencies are 
required to use to determine whether an area is blighted. These criteria, 
however, remain vague and subject to broad interpretation by redevelopment 
authorities, to which courts have granted great deference.234 
The United States Supreme Court has also further enunciated its principle 
of broad deference to legislative determinations of public use. In 1984, the 
228. The Poletown project is examined in THOMAS, supra note 12, at 161-66; Kochan, supra note 
14, at 69-72; and Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 418-21. 
229. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
230. Jd. at 459. 
23 I. !d. Note the similarity of the Poletown court's reasoning with the state cases discussed in 
footnotes 171-174 and accompanying text. 
232. See, e.g., Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963) 
(approving the condemnation of private businesses to build the World Trade Center); Karesh v. City 
Council, 247 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1978) (allowing condemnation for convention center and garage); Hogue 
v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171 (Wash. 1959) (approving condemnation of agricultural lands for private 
port facility); see also Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 418 n.43, 421 n.65 (citing additional cases). Thomas 
Merrill argues that state courts have been more skeptical about condemnation programs than federal 
courts. Merrill, supra note 14, at 96-97. In a swvey of over 200 cases decided between 1954 and 1986, 
Merrill found that state courts rejected a condemnation on the basis that it was not a public use in fifteen 
percent of the cases. See, e.g., Baycol Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 3 1 5  So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975) 
(rejecting attempt to condemn property for shopping mall). 
233. For an examination of current definitions of blight, see Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of 
Blight: A Sun'ey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389 (2000). 
234. Mansnerus, supra note 6, at 426. Many courts have declared that they will approve blight 
designations "absent fraud or abuse." Others impose a standard of"clear error." Luce, supra note 233, at 
409-13. 
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Court approved a program by the state of Hawaii to condemn the property of 
large landholders and sell it to other residents.235 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
ruled that the public use requirement was "coterminous with the scope of the 
sovereign's police powers'' and further stated that the Court would accept any 
use of eminent domain that was "rationally related to conceivable public 
purp0ses.''236 The Supreme Court's restraint in this area has led many 
commentators to complain that the Court has abdicated its responsibility to 
protect property owners from government abuse?37 Legal scholar Richard 
Epstein has argued that the Court has entirely read the phrase "public use" out 
of the Fifth Amendment.238 
In response to the courts' continued deference to legislative determinations 
of public use, scholars and legal advocates have given increased attention to the 
Public Use Clause in the past decade. Several recent lawjournal articles have 
critiqued the current interpretations of the doctrine. These scholars argne that 
eminent domain is used by ''rent seeking" groups that want to avoid private 
market negotiations. They also claim that eminent domain is abused by public 
authorities that are. controlled by private developers, and they argue for a 
stricter application of the Clause.239 
Legal advocates have also taken an increasing interest in the use of eminent 
domain. The Institute for Justice, based in Washington, D.C., has established an 
Eminent Domain Law Project that assists clients fighting the condemnation of 
their properties. The organization has taken on cases in several states, including 
New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, Mississippi, and Connecticut, 
representing clients such as a woman fighting the condemnation of her Atlantic 
City home for a casino owned by Donald. Trump and a group of African­
American farmers battling the efforts of the state. of Mississippi to condemn 
their property for the construction ·of an automobile plant.240 In the Atlantic 
City case, the condemnees succeeded in convincing the trial judge that the 
transfer of their property to Trump Casino violated the Public Use Clause?41 
235. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
236. ld. at 240, 241. 
237. Kochan, supra note 14, at 115; Mansnerus,supra note 6, at424. 
238. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 161-63. 
239. See, e.g. , Jones, supra note 14, at 306 (suggesting that courts use "strict scrutiny" in assessing 
the use of eminent domain); Kochan, supra note 14, at 110-11 (proposing the creation of "political 
filters" to increase the cost to private parties of using condenmation to acquire property); Mansnerus, 
supra note 6, at 444 (arguing for a requirement-of ''true rational basis," by which courts would review 
uses of eminent domain). But see Merrill, supra note 14, which concludes that state courts have done a 
fairly good job of balancing interests in eminent domain cases. 
240. Inst. for Just., Litigation Backgrounder, Saving the Skin of Property Owners in ConnectiCut 
(2001 ); David Firestone,. Black Families Resist Mzssissippi Land Push, N.Y. TIMES,- Sept. 10, 2001, at 
A20; Laura Mansnerus, There Stays the Hotel and the Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2000, § 1,  at 
21.  
241. Casino Redev. Auth. v. Banin,. 727 A.2d lD-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998); David M. 
Herszenhorn, Widowed Homeowner Foils Trump in Atlantic City, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1998, at B I.  
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The judge's decision, however, rested on defects in the condemnation process 
and did not attempt to reinterpret the Public Use Clause. Therefore, while the 
anti-eminent domain effort has increased the cost of condemnation to specific 
developers and delayed the process in several cases, the initiative has yet to 
significantly alter interpretations of the Public Use Clause. These efforts have, 
however, raised public attention to the issue of condemnation, and increased 
political opposition to eminent domain has helped defeat recent urban 
redevelopment initiatives in Baltimore and Pittsburgh_242 
American cities have witnessed dramatic political and demographic 
changes since the 1 950s. African-American mayors lead many urban areas, and 
blacks and other minorities play a major role in the political structure of most 
large cities. The housing shortages that most cities experienced in the post­
World War II era are no longer a concern. Instead, policy-makers face a glut of 
abandoned, vacant buildings. Urban policies that supported segregation in the 
1940s and 1950s are a fait accompli in the modem era, and many cities have 
reached what sociologists call "hyper-segregation."243 In this context, urban 
redevelopment policies have a very different impact on city residents. 
Community members are generally more concerned with the lack of 
government involvement than with fears of eminent domain. 
Policymakers continue to argue that land clearance is crucial to the rebirth 
of the city, and the rhetoric of blight continues to shape urban policy. The city 
of Philadelphia, for example, is currently considering a major "Neighborhood 
Transformation Initiative," which aims to clear large areas of the city's most 
dilapidated housing in the hope that the cleared land will attract private 
development. While the city's African-American mayor never uses the term, 
Philadelphia's newspapers make constant reference to the "blight problem," 
and several articles have discussed the need to stop the disease of blight before 
it affiicts other neighborhoods?44 In Detroit, the clearance of the city's more 
than 10,000 abandoned structures has brought about greater use of the city's 
eminent domain powers. Community activists have argued that government 
condemnation is crucial to the solution of this problem. "Blight is like a 
cancer," argued one activist in the sununer of 2002. "Our theory has been we 
can eliminate it before it spreads."245 
In the abstract, the goals of these initiatives are widely accepted and 
praised. The taking of fire-ravaged buildings that serve only to shelter drug 
242. David Nitkin & Joe Nawrozki, Condemnation Bill Defeated: Baltimore County Plan to Renew 
East Side Loses by 2 to 1, BALT. SUN, Nov. · 8, 2000, at lA; James Zambroski, Revitalization Plan Back 
to Square One, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV ., Nov. 23, 2000. 
243. On the increasing segregation of American cities, see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 220. 
244. See, e.g., Jennifer Lin, Keeping Blight at Bay, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 25, 2001, at A24; 
Monica Y ant Kinney, Growing a Leafy Antidote to Decay, PmLA. INQmRER, Nov. 29, 2001, at B I .  
245. Jodi Wilgoren, Detroit Urban Renewal Without the Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 1,  at 
10. 
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dealers does not elicit much sympathy . .  But most city neighborhoods do not 
present such an easy case as Detroit. In many poor areas, residents struggle to 
build community in the midst of abandonment. Blight, while sometimes 
obvious, remains in the eye of the beholder. Only when specific properties are 
identified for redevelopment will the public benefits · of renewal meet the 
resisrance of property owners and renters. While land in urban areas may be 
less valuable today than it was fifty years. ago, the competition over the 
property within American cities will continue to implicate and shape the public 
use doctrine. 
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